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I   INTRODUCTION 
It is well-established under the Australian law of negligence that medical 
practitioners owe a comprehensive duty of care to patients. The duty 
encompasses all aspects of their role and requires practitioners to take reasonable 
care in the provision of diagnosis, treatment, and information and advice.P854F1 P In 
respect of the latter part of this duty, the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker 
imposed an obligation upon practitioners to disclose to patients all material risks 
inherent in undergoing or forgoing surgery or other interventions. P855F2P An inherent 
risk   of   a   procedure   is   one   which   ‘cannot   be   avoided   by’   the   practitioner’s  
‘exercise   of   reasonable   care   and   skill’, P856F3P and the majority in Rogers v Whitaker 
observed that a risk is classed as material if 
in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in   the   patient’s  
position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the 
medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. P857F4 
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1  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 483 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), 
492 (Gaudron J). 
2  Ibid 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
3  See, eg, Paul v Cooke (2013) 85 NSWLR 167, 182 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing). See also at 
171 (Basten JA); Cox v Fellows [2013] NSWCA 206, [189] (Gleeson JA). Legislation excluding liability 
in  negligence  ‘for  harm  suffered  by  another  person  as  a  result  of  the  materialisation  of  an  inherent  risk’  
does not apply in this context: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5I. See also Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
s 16; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 39; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 55; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5P. 
4  (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). See also at 493 
(Gaudron J). 
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As confirmed by the Review of the Law of Negligence, P858F5P and statute enacted  
in some jurisdictions, P859F6P this duty to warn of material risks is both proactive and 
reactive. The proactive duty requires the doctor to volunteer information which 
he or she considers to be material to the reasonable patient (an objective test). 
The reactive duty requires the doctor to provide information in response to a 
particular   patient’s   circumstances,   or   their   specific   concerns   or questions (a 
subjective test). Notably then, standards of risk disclosure in Australia are not 
dictated by those judged acceptable by the medical profession. P860F7P Rather, the courts 
have adopted a patient-centred approach to this aspect of the practitioner’s  duty  
of  care  with  the  stated  aim  of  empowering  patients  ‘to  make  their  own  decisions  
about   important   procedures   to   be   undertaken   on   their   bodies’   on   the   basis   of  
information about material risks relevant to them. P861F8P Consequently, whether a risk 
is material may depend upon: the likelihood and seriousness of the risk to be 
disclosed; the nature and/or necessity of the treatment being provided; the 
patient’s   desire   for   information;;   the   patient’s   health   and   temperament;;   and  
general matters, such as alternative sources of advice or treatment. P862F9 
The approach to determining whether a risk is material in a particular case is 
well-established under Australian law. This is arguably supported by Bismark et 
al who in 2012 concluded, from a sample of approximately 10 000 malpractice 
claims and conciliated healthcare complaints, that of the 375 disputes relating to 
non-disclosure   of   risk,   only   45   involved   ‘disagreements   between   patients   and  
                                                 
5  David Andrew Ipp, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) 48–53 
(‘Ipp Report’). 
6  See Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 21; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)  s  21,  which  apply  to  ‘doctors’  and  
‘registered  medical  practitioners’  respectively.  Section  50  of  the  Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)  provides  that  ‘a  
person (the defendant) who owes a duty of care ... to give a warning or other information to the plaintiff 
in  respect  of  a  risk  or  other  matter,  satisfies  that  duty  …  if  the  defendant  takes  reasonable  care  in  giving  
that  warning  or  other  information’.  While  this  provision  is  wider than that in the other jurisdictions, in a 
medical context, it would appear to operate consistently with the test for when a risk is material 
determined by the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).  
7  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 487 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). In 
fact, statutes providing for the use of peer professional opinion in the determination of the breach of a 
professional’s  standard  of  care  specifically  exclude  the  use  of  such  opinion  in  relation  to  ‘liability  arising  
in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or other information in respect 
of  the  risk  of  death  of  or  injury  to  a  person’:  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5P. See also Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld) s 22(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 41(5); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 22(5); 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 60; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5PB(2).  
8  Ian  Freckelton,  ‘Rogers v Whitaker Reconsidered’  (2001)  9  Journal of Law and Medicine 5, 11. See also 
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 482 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ); 
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 271–2, 276 (Kirby J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 
477 (Kirby J). 
9  F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 192 ff (King CJ), affd Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 488, 490 
(Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). See, eg, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 
434; KL v Farnsworth [2002] NSWSC 382; Henderson v Low [2001] QSC 496; Johnson v Biggs [2000] 
NSWCA  338;;  Thomas  Addison,  ‘Negligent  Failure  to  Inform:  Developments  in  the  Law  since  Rogers v 
Whitaker’  (2003)  11  Torts Law Journal 165, 167–80. 
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clinicians  over  whether  a  risk  ought   to  have  been  disclosed’. P863F10P In the remaining 
disputes, the practitioner either: conceded liability; claimed that responsibility to 
disclose lay with another; contended that the risk had been disclosed; or denied 
liability on the basis that the failure to disclose had not caused the patient’s  
harm. P864F11 P Similarly, in Wallace v Kam P865F12 P there was no question on appeal as to 
whether the specific risks involved were considered to be material. The key issue 
for determination by the High Court was whether causation could be 
established. P866F13P However, the particular negligence claim in Wallace v Kam was 
unlike other non-disclosure cases requiring a consideration of causation. Not only 
was Wallace v Kam the first High Court decision on risk non-disclosure pursuant 
to  the  civil   liability  legislation’s  causation  provisions, P867F14P but its particular factual 
matrix also made it unique in Australian law. 
As with any negligence claim, a patient who alleges that a medical 
practitioner   is   liable   for   failing   to   warn   of   a   procedure’s  material   risk(s)   must  
establish that the duty owed was breached (that is, that a material risk was not 
disclosed) and that the harm sustained was caused by that breach. A finding of 
causation in such cases commonly hinges upon the patient establishing that, had 
they  been  disclosed  pursuant  to  the  practitioner’s  duty  of  care,  the  patient  would  
not have suffered injury in the form of the physical manifestation of one or more 
risks inherent in the procedure. This is because each occurring risk would have 
individually resulted in the patient delaying or refusing the treatment. P868F15P Wallace v 
Kam instead   required   an   assessment  of  whether   a  practitioner’s   liability   should  
extend to the situation where a patient would not have undergone treatment if all 
material risks had been disclosed, but would have still undergone treatment at the 
same time and place if warned only of the risk that ultimately transpired. P869F16P  
                                                 
10  Marie  M  Bismark  et  al,  ‘Legal  Disputes  over  Duties  to  Disclose  Treatment Risks to Patients: A Review 
of  Negligence  Claims  and  Complaints  in  Australia’  (2012)  9(8)  PLOS Medicine 1, 2. 
11  Ibid 3. 
12  (2013) 250 CLR 375. 
13  Ibid 379, 387. See also Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 045 [8], 66 047 [14], 66 
052 [46], 66 054–55[66]–[69], 66 065 [136]. Discussed below nn 56–60, 63 and accompanying text. 
14  Discussed below Part II. 
15  See, eg, Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127, where the patient claimed that the defendant surgeon had 
failed to warn him of a number of material risks of surgery to repair bilateral inguinal hernias which, in 
fact, materialised. The risks included: gross swelling of the scrotum; chronic pain resulting from nerve 
entrapment;;  and  embolism.  Evidence  was  given  in  relation  to  each  risk  that  the  patient  ‘would  not  have  
undergone  the  operation  if  he  had  been  properly  warned’:  at  [34]–[37] (Basten JA), [1] (Beazley JA 
agreeing). See also at [97], [105] (Basten JA); Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553, 
578–9, 582–90 (Samuels JA), 607 (Meagher JA agreeing) (non-disclosure of a risk of paralysis and 
failure to relieve pain following surgery, in circumstances where the patient would not have undergone 
the procedure and sustained quadriplegia had the slight paralysis risk been known). In the context of 
delayed surgery, see, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998)  195  CLR  232  (failure  to  warn  of  injury  to  the  patient’s  
voice consequent upon infection occurring after perforation of the oesophagus during throat surgery), 
discussed further below nn 160, 183, 236, 285 and accompanying text.  
16  (2013) 250 CLR 375, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
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Through an examination of Wallace v Kam, this article considers and 
evaluates  the  law  of  causation  in  the  specific  context  of  a  medical  practitioner’s  
duty to provide information to patients concerning material risks of treatment. To 
supply a contextual background for the analysis which follows, Part II 
summarises the basic principles of causation law, while Part III provides an 
overview of the case and the reasoning adopted in the decisions at first instance 
and on appeal. With particular emphasis upon the reasoning in the courts of 
appeal, P870F17 P Part IV then examines the implications of the case in the context of 
other jurisprudence in this field and, in so doing, provides a framework for a 
structured consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases under 
the Australian civil liability legislation. As will become clear, Wallace was 
fundamentally decided on the basis of policy reasoning centred upon the purpose 
behind the legal duty violated. Although the plurality in Rogers v Whitaker 
rejected the utility of expressions   such   as   ‘the   patient’s   right   of   self-
determination’ P871F18P in this context, some Australian jurisprudence may be thought to 
frame  the  practitioner’s  duty  to  warn  in  terms  of  promoting  a  patient’s  autonomy,  
or right to decide whether to submit to treatment proposed. Accordingly, the 
impact of Wallace upon the protection of this right, and the interrelation between 
it and the purpose of the duty to warn, is investigated. P872F19P The analysis in Part IV 
also   evaluates   the   courts’   reasoning   in   Wallace by questioning the extent to 
which Wallace’s  approach  to  liability  and  causal  connection  in  non-disclosure of 
risk cases depends upon the nature and classification of the risk(s) in question, 
and can be reconciled with the way in which patients make decisions. Finally, 
Part V adopts a comparative approach by considering whether the same decision 
might be reached if Wallace was determined according to English law. 
 
II   CAUSATION: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
At law, causation arises in the context of assigning legal responsibility  
for a particular act or omission, P873F 20 P and requires a determination of whether a 
defendant’s  conduct  played  a  part  in  bringing  about  the  harm  that  is  the  subject  of  
the   claimant’s   negligence   action.   As   such,   it   is   not   resolved   according   to the 
                                                 
17  For the remainder of this article, the term Wallace is used to refer to the case generally on appeal (in the 
NSW Court of Appeal and in the High Court of Australia), unless indicated otherwise. 
18  (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) (citations omitted). 
Indeed  their  Honours  stated  that  ‘nothing  is  to  be  gained  by  reiterating  [such]  expressions  [as]  used  in  
American  authorities’.  Amongst  American  authorities,  see,  eg,  Canterbury v Spence, 464 F 2d 772, 780, 
786–7 (DC Cir, 1972). 
19  See discussion below Part IV(B). 
20  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 509, 514 (Mason CJ); Chappel v Hart (1998) 
195 CLR 232, 238 (Gaudron J); Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 381 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, 
Gageler and Keane JJ). 
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‘relationship   between   conditions   and   occurrences’   prescribed   by   scientific   or  
philosophical theory. P874F21P Instead, it is based upon a consideration of the facts of a 
particular  case  when  viewed  in  light  of  ‘the  practical  way  in  which  the  ordinary  
man’s  mind  works   in   the  every-day  affairs  of   life’. P875F22P For this purpose then, the 
common   law   has   always   recognised   that   there   are   ‘two   fundamental   questions  
involved  in  the  determination  of  causation  in  tort’: P876F23 
The first relates to the factual aspect of causation, namely, the aspect that is 
concerned with whether the negligent conduct in question played a part in 
bringing about the harm, the subject of the claim ... The second aspect concerns 
‘the  “appropriate”  scope  of  liability  for  the  consequences  of  tortious  conduct’.  In  
other words, the ultimate question to be answered when addressing the second 
aspect is a normative one, namely, whether the defendant ought to be held liable to 
pay damages for that harm. P877F24 
These elements are now apparent in sections 5D(1)(a) and (b) respectively of 
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Accordingly, the statutory provisions 
relevant to determining causation in New South Wales (and the equivalent 
provisions in other jurisdictions) P878F25P have been stated to, in general terms, reflect 
                                                 
21  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 509 (Mason CJ). See also at 522 (Deane J), 
529 (McHugh J); Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 238 (Gaudron J), 242 (McHugh J), 255 
(Gummow J), 268–9 (Kirby J); Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 687 (Kiefel J); 
Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 443 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ); Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis (2010) 240 CLR 111, 121–2, 128 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, 
Gageler and Keane JJ). 
22  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305, 321 (Lord Bingham), quoting McGhee 
v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008, 1011 (Lord Reid). 
23  Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269, 286 (Ipp JA) (in the context of a false imprisonment claim).  
24  Ibid (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See also Pledge v Roads and Traffic Authority (2004) 205 
ALR  56,  59  (Hayne  J);;  Jane  Stapleton,  ‘Cause  in  Fact  and  the  Scope  of  Liability  for  Consequences’  
(2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 388, 388–9, 411. 
25  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5D(1), (4); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 11(1), (4); Wrongs Act 
1958 (Vic) ss 51(1), (4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 34(1), (3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) ss 
5C(1), (4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) ss 13(1), (4); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 45 (1), (3). 
Subsection (2) of the legislation in each jurisdiction provides principles relevant to a determination of 
factual causation in exceptional or appropriate cases falling outside sub-s (1). However, such 
circumstances did not fall for consideration in Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 384, 387 (French CJ, 
Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). For the purpose of this article, the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) is predominantly referred to given that it was the legislation relevant to the decision in Wallace.  
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the common law. P879F26P Thus, in order to establish liability, including that for non-
disclosure   of   risk,   section   5D(1)(a)   first   requires   a   claimant   to   prove   ‘factual  
causation’,   or   that   the   defendant’s   negligence   was   ‘a   necessary   condition of  
the   occurrence   of   the   [claimant’s]   harm’.   As   a   necessary   condition   is   ‘a   
condition  that  must  be  present  for  the  occurrence  of  the  harm’, P880F27P causation will be 
established under this section if, on the balance of probabilities, P881F28P the claimant’s  
harm  would  not  have  occurred  ‘but  for’  the  defendant’s  breach  of  his  or  her  duty  
of care. P882F29P  
At  common  law,  while  ‘useful  in  defining  the  outer  limits  of  liability  where  
causation  is  contested’,  the  ‘but  for’  test  was  never  regarded  as  a  comprehensive 
test of factual causation. P883F 30 P Rather, it was considered that the results the test 
yielded   required   tempering   by   common   sense,   or   ‘the   making   of   value  
judgments’, P884F 31 P such that normative issues could influence findings of factual 
cause. P885F32P The  selection,  for  the  purpose  of  attributing  legal  responsibility,  ‘of  those  
                                                 
26  Finch v Rogers [2004] NSWSC 39, [146] (Kirby J); Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269, 286 (Ipp 
J) (the principles embodied in s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)  ‘are  in  accord  with  the  common  
law’);;  cf French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2011) 58 MVR 214, 250 (Fryberg J). However, at 
common law, issues of factual causation and scope of liability were not always separately considered as 
they are now: see below nn 30–48, 80–1 and accompanying text. In addition, at common law, a 
claimant’s  direct  testimony  on  the  issue  of  causation  was  allowed.  However,  as  discussed  further  below  
nn 143–51 and accompanying text, in order to protect against hindsight bias and the possible self-serving 
nature of such testimony, s 5D(3)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (and its equivalent in other 
jurisdictions)  now  provides  that  while  the  issue  of  whether,  irrespective  of  a  defendant’s  negligence,  a  
claimant would have been injured just the same remains subjective, any statement made by the claimant 
about  what  they  would  have  done  ‘but  for’  that  negligence  is  inadmissible,  unless  against  their  interest.  
For a discussion of the position at common law, see Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 272–3 (Kirby 
J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 443–4, 449 (McHugh J), 461–2 (Gummow J), 485–7 
(Kirby J), 501–2, 504–5 (Callinan J).  
27  Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 191 (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also 
at 199 (Heydon J). 
28  See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5E; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 12; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 52; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5D; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s 14; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 46. See also, at common law, Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis 
(2010) 240 CLR 111, 123 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Tabet v 
Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 578 (Kiefel J), 564 (Hayne and Bell JJ agreeing), 575 (Crennan J agreeing). 
29  See, eg, Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190 (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ); 
Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 440, 442–3 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
30  Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 674 (Kirby J). See also at 663 (Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ), 687 (Kiefel J); Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190–1 (French CJ, 
Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ); Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 638 
(Gleeson CJ).  
31  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 516 (Mason CJ), 535–6 (McHugh J). See also 
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 255 (Gummow J). 
32  See,  eg,  ‘[w]here  negligence  is  in  issue,  causation  is  essentially  a  question  of  fact  …  into  which  
considerations of  policy  and  value  judgments  necessarily  enter’:  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd 
(1991) 171 CLR 506, 524 (Toohey J). See also at 515–16 (Mason CJ), 522 (Deane J); Steven 
Yannoulidis,  ‘Causation  in  the  Law  of  Negligence’  (2001)  27  Monash University Law Review 319. 
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causative   factors   which   [were]   determinative   of   liability’,   was   therefore  
influenced   by   ‘considerations   of   legal   policy’, P886F 33 P influenced by community 
values, P887F34P and distinguished from judicial or personal whim. P888F35P As a result, in some 
situations,   it   was   possible   for   ‘the   applicable   legal   framework’   to   require   ‘a  
finding that no causal connection exist[ed] for legal purposes even though a 
physical connection exist[ed] between the thing complained of and the 
damage’. P889F36 
By comparison, under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), whether a factor 
ought to be a legally significant cause in this manner falls for consideration under 
section 5D(1)(b). P890F 37 P This section requires a court to consider the appropriate 
‘scope   of   liability’,   or  whether   ‘it   is   appropriate   for   the   scope   of   the   negligent  
person’s   liability   to   extend   to   the   harm   so   caused’.   This   necessitates   an  
assessment,  under  subsection  (4),  of   ‘whether  or  not  and  why responsibility for 
the  harm  should  be  imposed’.  A  detailed  analysis  of  all  normative  issues  capable  
of consideration as part of scope of liability, if indeed possible, P891F38P is outside the 
parameters of this article. Nevertheless, considerations falling under this element 
would   include   questions   raised   by:   ‘intervening   and   successive   causes’   (or   
novus actus interveniens); P892F39P ‘foreseeability  and   remoteness’;; P893F40P ‘the   terms of any 
applicable  statute’;; P894F41P and, as discussed below, P895F42P the purpose of the rule or duty of 
care violated. In French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd, Fryberg J also 
considered   that   the   factors   relevant   to   determining   scope   of   liability   ‘might 
overlap  or  duplicate  those  considered  in  relation  to  the  existence  of  a  duty’,  or  its  
                                                 
33  Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568, 586–7 (McHugh J); Travel 
Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 643 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
34  Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 648 (Kirby J). 
35  Ibid 650. See also Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 675 (Kirby J).  
36  Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568, 586 (McHugh J). See also 
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 491 (McHugh J); Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 
245 ALR 653, 663 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 687 (Kiefel J).  
37  See, eg, Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190–1 (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell 
JJ); Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR  420.  ‘Dividing  the  issue  of  causation  in  this  way  
expresses the relevant questions in a way that may differ from what was said by Mason CJ [in March v E 
& M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991)  171  CLR  506]  to  be  the  common  law’s  approach  to  causation’:  at  440  
(French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).  
38  Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 648 (Kirby J). 
39  Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94, [70] (Basten JA), [1] 
(McColl JA agreeing), [113] (Young JA agreeing); Ipp Report, above n 5, 115. See also Roads and 
Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 675 (Kirby J); Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree 
(2005) 224 CLR 627, 637–8 (Gleeson CJ). 
40  Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94, [70] (Basten, JA), [1] 
(McColl JA agreeing), [113] (Young JA agreeing); Ipp Report, above n 5, 117. 
41  Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 648 (Kirby J); Neville v Lam [No 3] [2014] 
NSWSC 607, [195] (Beech-Jones J), discussed below n 136.  
42  See especially below nn 104–36 and accompanying text; below Parts IV(A)(2), IV(B), V.  
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breach,   and   included   within   these   the   notion   of   ‘[p]roximity   (or   lack   of   it)   in  
time,  place  and  relationship’. P896F43 
Both elements of causation are discussed further below, in the context of the 
factual circumstances of Wallace. At this stage however it is important to  
note that, although the subject of both academic P897F44 P and judicialP898F45 P criticism, the 
bifurcation of causation into factual and normative issues effected by sections 
5D(1)(a) and (b) was upheld. P899F46 P While an exception to this bifurcation may be 
found in section 5D(2), P900F47P as it was not in issue in Wallace, this provision is not 
                                                 
43  (2011) 58 MVR 214, 250. See also Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702, 706 (Allsop P) (the 
‘attenuated  standard  of  care’  owed  by  the  defendant  was  considered  to  inform  the  appropriate  scope  of  
liability under ss 5D(1)(b) and (4) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)). For further factors relevant at 
common law that may also apply to scope of liability under the civil liability legislation, see generally 
Stapleton, above n 24, 411 ff; Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 639, 660–6 (Santow JA). 
44  See,  eg,  David  Hamer,  ‘“Factual  Causation”  and  “Scope  of  Liability”: What’s  the  Difference?’  (2014)  77  
Modern Law Review 155. 
45  See, eg, Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 639, 643 (Spigelman CJ); Travel Compensation Fund v 
Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 643 (Gummow and Hayne JJ) (The specific consideration of whether a 
defendant ought to be liable to pay damages for harm was argued to be inconsistent with the rejection, by 
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, of the test from Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 
605. This test incorporates notions of what is fair, just and reasonable into the resolution of whether a 
duty of care is owed in negligence.). See also Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 
627, 653–4 (Callinan J); cf at 647–50 (Kirby J). 
46  See discussion below nn 80–82, 98–103 and accompanying text. 
47  See above n 25. Section 5D(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that: 
In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, whether negligence that 
cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as 
establishing factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and 
why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party. 
 As  such,  where  the  ‘but  for’  test  is  not  satisfied,  sub-s (2) arguably allows, in  applying  other  ‘established  
principles’,  for  a  consideration  of  normative  issues  when  deciding  factual  causation:  see,  eg,  Wallace v 
Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 044–45 [4] (Allsop P), 66 069 [163] (Basten JA); Strong v 
Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182, 194 (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Adeels 
Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 443 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). 
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considered further here. P901F48P Furthermore, it was the second element – concerning 
the  scope  of  Dr  Kam’s   liability   – upon which the case ultimately failed. In the 
next part we provide an outline of the reasoning in this regard, as decided by each 
of the courts as the matter progressed on appeal. 
 
III   THE DECISION IN WALLACE V KAM: ITS PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY AND THE REASONING ADOPTED AT EACH STAGE 
The claimant in Wallace had a history of back pain caused by an 
intervertebral disc protrusion in the lumbar spine due to heavy lifting at work. 
Over  time,  Mr  Wallace’s  back  problems worsened and, in 2004, he was referred 
to a neurosurgeon, Dr Kam. After an unsuccessful attempt to manage the pain 
through   weight   loss,   Kam   performed   lumbar   fusion   surgery   (‘the   procedure’)  
which carried with it two inherent risks that were of relevance   to   Wallace’s  
claim. The first was a risk of bilateral femoral neurapraxia – a form of temporary 
local nerve damage to the anterior femoral, or thigh, region of the leg, stemming 
from the fact that the surgery required the patient to lie prone for an extended 
period of time. The second, more serious, risk was a one-in-twenty chance of 
permanent and catastrophic paralysis, or spinal nerve damage. Although this 
latter risk did not eventuate in the circumstances of the case, Kam warned 
Wallace of neither risk prior to the procedure taking place. P902F49 
The day after the procedure, Wallace experienced extreme pain and paralysis 
in both legs. These issues persisted after further surgery and resulted in a 
                                                 
48  Although waiting further determination by the High Court, it is commonly assumed that instances falling 
within s 5D(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) would include those similar to McGhee v National 
Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008, Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613, and Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 305. In these cases, two or more separate factors, or 
breaches, operated either individually or cumulatively in such a way that neither medicine nor science 
could determine their relative contribution to the particular harm claimed in a way  that  satisfied  the  ‘but  
for’  test.  Nevertheless,  a  sufficient  causal  connection  was  established  by  showing  that  the  defendant’s  
wrongful act or omission had instead materially increased the risk of the harm occurring: see, eg, Ipp 
Report, above n 5, 109–11. Because Wallace classified  a  medical  practitioner’s  duty  to  warn  as  a  single  
comprehensive  duty,  in  a  case  involving  a  failure  to  disclose  a  procedure’s  multiple  material  risks,  it  
requires factual causation to be determined on the basis of the entirety  of  a  defendant’s  solitary  breach  by  
considering what a patient would have done had all risks been disclosed: see below nn 152–5 and 
accompanying text. Consequently, as the non-disclosure of multiple risks by one defendant does not 
operate as a separate breach of duty (or warrant a separate consideration of factual causation) for each 
risk,  it  is  submitted  that  on  the  basis  of  previous  authority,  even  if  the  relative  contribution  of  each  risk’s  
non-disclosure  to  the  occurrence  of  a  patient’s  harm  (or  decision to have a procedure) could not be 
shown, it is unlikely that a failure to establish factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) in Wallace would have 
attracted the operation of s 5D(2). Furthermore, if sub-s (2) did apply, it is likely that the normative 
considerations discussed below in Parts IV(A) and (B) would still operate to deny causation under it. See, 
eg, Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 443–4 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
49  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 379–80, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
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diagnosis of bilateral femoral neurapraxia. It was not claimed   that   Wallace’s  
neurapraxia   was   caused   by   Kam’s   negligent   or   substandard   performance   of   
the procedure itself. P903F50P Instead, the case was argued solely on the basis that the 
medical   practitioner’s   negligent   non-disclosure of both risks had caused the 
patient’s  injury. P904F51 
Initially, the case may appear similar to many other negligence actions 
concerning a failure to warn of surgical risks. As mentioned above, P905F52P it in fact 
presented a unique normative issue. Had a warning concerning the risk of 
neurapraxia (the harm which did eventuate) been provided by Kam, it was 
considered that Wallace would have been willing to run that risk. P906F53P However, it 
was argued that had Kam warned of the more serious risk of paralysis, in 
addition to the risk of neurapraxia, Wallace would have declined the procedure 
and avoided the neurapraxia as a consequence. P907F54 P The case therefore raised the 
difficult question of whether a doctor should be liable for an injury that a patient 
may be willing to accept, but would have avoided had the warning included 
information concerning a different material risk. 
 
A   The Decision at First Instance 
At trial in the New South Wales Supreme Court, P908F55P Harrison J considered that, 
as  Wallace  had  already  been  ‘housebound  and  bedridden  due  to  a  combination  of  
back  pain  and  obesity  for  many  weeks’,   the  possibility  of  ‘further,  even   if  only  
but not necessarily temporary or transitory,  interference  with  his  mobility’  would  
be significant to both a reasonable, and the particular, patient. P909F56 P Accordingly, 
Kam was held to have breached both the proactive and reactive limbs P910F57P of his 
duty to warn by failing to advise Wallace of the material risk of neurapraxia. P911F58 P 
Despite this conclusion, no finding was made concerning the failure to warn of 
the risk of paralysis P912F59P because,   according   to  his  Honour,   ‘the   legal   cause  of   [a]  
                                                 
50  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [1]. 
51  Ibid. 
52  See above nn 12–16 and accompanying text. 
53  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [91], affd Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 048 [20]; Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 379. 
54  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [95]; Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports 
¶82–101, 66 051 [39], 66 054 [65] (Beazley JA), 66 068 [157] (Basten JA); Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 
CLR 375, 379–80, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
55  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518. 
56  Ibid [49]. 
57  See above n 5 and accompanying text. 
58  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [48]–[51]. 
59  However,  on  appeal,  Beazley  JA  considered  that  ‘[a]  reasonable  person,  contemplating  operative  
treatment to resolve a condition that was not life threatening and potentially not urgent, may well attach 
significance to a 5 per cent risk of a catastrophic outcome in making a decision as to whether or not to 
undergo  surgery’:  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 054 [67]. See also at 66 052 
[49], 66 065 [136], 66 067 [152] (Beazley JA). 
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condition’  – here neurapraxia – ‘could  never be the failure to warn of some other 
risk  that  did  not  materialise’. P913F60 
Justice Harrison consequently addressed the risk of neurapraxia separately, 
and   concluded   that  Wallace’s   claim   should   not   succeed   due   to   an   inability   to  
prove factual causation under section 5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW). P914F61P It  was  determined  that  Kam’s  breach  was  not  a  necessary  condition  of  
the  occurrence  of  the  harm  because  ‘having  regard  to  his  desperate  preoperative  
plight’, P915F62P if warned of the risk of neurapraxia alone, Wallace would have not have 
refused or delayed the procedure. On this basis, no further findings were made on 
the issue of causation. Notably, Harrison J did not acknowledge the significance 
of the risk of paralysis being disclosed in conjunction with the risk of 
neurapraxia.  His  Honour’s  judgment  also  failed  to  consider  the  scope  of  liability  
issues relevant to the second element of establishing causation, for either of the 
two risks. 
 
B   The New South Wales Court of Appeal 
Wallace also failed on the causation issue in the Court of Appeal. 
Nevertheless, the reasoning there differed significantly to that at first instance. 
As it was not decided at trial, the decisions on appeal assumed that the risk of 
paralysis in Wallace was material and that, if warned of it, the claimant would 
not have undergone the procedure. P916F63P Accordingly, on the premise that patients are 
                                                 
60  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [96]. 
61  Ibid [70]–[71], [91]–[94]. 
62  Ibid  [94].  Justice  Harrison  considered  the  circumstances  such  that  ‘[t]he  prospect  for  this plaintiff of some 
mild and temporary interference with power and sensation in his lower limbs [in the form of bilateral 
femoral  neurapraxia,  would  be]  …  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  disabling  and  distressing  condition  from  
which  he  hoped  Dr  Kam’s  surgery  would  provide  a  cure  or  at  least  some  relief’.  See  also  Wallace v Kam 
(2013) 250 CLR 375, 379 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ); Wallace v Kam [2012] 
Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 048–49 [20] (Allsop P). 
63  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 046 [11], 66 049 [22] (Allsop P), 66 054–55 [67]–
[69], 66 067 [152]–[153] (Beazley JA), 66 068 [156]–[157], 66 071 [174] (Basten JA); Wallace v Kam 
(2013) 250 CLR 375, 380 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). Accordingly, as noted 
previously at above n 12–13 and accompanying text, whether the risks were material was not an issue on 
appeal in Wallace.  Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley  further  noted  that  although  it  was  ‘not  appropriate  for  the  
Court to engage in a fact finding  task  of  this  nature’,  Wallace’s  submission  (that  had  both  risks  been  
known,  he  would  have  declined  the  procedure)  was  supported  by  ‘his  weight  being  more  than  he  believed  
…  the  scope  for  more  weight  loss  before  the  surgery  was  finally  decided  upon  …  a  misapprehension that 
the  back  surgery  was  necessary  at  that  time;;  that  the  surgery  was  not  urgent’  and  that  the  ‘reason  for  
recommending  it  at  that  time  was  the  appellant’s  loss  of  quality  of  life’:  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 055 [68], 66 067 [153]. In Wallace, prior to the procedure, the patient had tried to 
manage his pain through weight loss and believed that although he had lost weight the pain had 
worsened. Unknown to him, his scales were inaccurate and he had actually gained weight: see, in the 
High  Court  of  Australia,  Ian  Wallace,  ‘Appellant’s  Amended  Submissions’,  Submission  in  Wallace v 
Kam, S307/2012, 1 November 2012, [17]–[18], [21]. 
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entitled  to  make  decisions  ‘on  the  basis  of  complete  information’, P917F64P the Court of 
Appeal (Allsop P, Beazley and Basten JJA) P918F 65 P accepted that factual causation 
could potentially be established because, on the facts assumed, had he known  
of all risks – particularly the risk of paralysis P919F66P – Wallace would have avoided 
injury. However, Wallace was again unsuccessful as Allsop P and Basten JA  
held that responsibility for the harm suffered should not extend to Kam. P920F67P In this 
respect, that Wallace was willing to run the risk of neurapraxia in isolation was 
particularly significant, and according to Basten JA, made the imposition of 
liability contrived: 
Once the trial judge was not persuaded that a warning as to bilateral femoral 
neurapraxia would have led to a postponement of the operation, why should the 
practitioner bear responsibility for breach of a separate duty to warn of a risk 
which did not materialise? Recovery in such circumstances appears 
opportunistic.P921F68 
President Allsop similarly precluded recovery for neurapraxia pursuant to 
sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), by limiting the 
scope   of   a   practitioner’s   duty   of   disclosure   to   protecting   patients   ‘from   harm  
from  material  inherent  risks  that  are  unacceptable’  to  them. P922F69 
                                                 
64  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [14] (Allsop P). See also at 66 045 [8] 
(Allsop P). 
65  Ibid 66 047 [14] (Allsop P), 66 065–6 [138], 66 066 [143] (Beazley JA). In relation to Basten JA, 
although  stating  that  ‘[t]he  causal  relationship  would  be  established  by  a  finding  (yet  to  be  made)  that,  if  
warned of the potentially catastrophic risk [of paralysis], the appellant would not have undergone the 
procedure’:  at  66  071  [174],  it should be noted that his Honour does not appear entirely convinced that 
factual causation could be established in Wallace. Firstly, Justice of Appeal  Basten’s  conclusion  under  s  
5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is expressed as potentially contingent upon the policy 
considerations discussed below n 68 and accompanying text: Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports 
¶82–101, 66 071–2 [175]. Secondly, as reflected in those considerations, his Honour seems to endorse the 
trial  judge’s  decision  on  factual  causation  by  viewing  the  duty  to  warn  in  the  case  of  multiple  risks  as  
requiring a distinct duty, and therefore a separate consideration of factual causation for each risk: at 66 
068–89 [161], 66 070 [169]–[170], 66 071 [173], 66 072 [180]. By comparison, Allsop P and Beazley JA 
both  considered  Kam’s  duty  to  warn  to  be  a  single  comprehensive  duty  covering  all  material  risks  and  
this directed their  Honours’  approaches  and  conclusions  regarding  factual  causation:  at  66  045  [8]  (Allsop  
P), 66 054 [62], 66 061 [110]–[111], 66 066 [143] (Beazley JA). Nevertheless, in the event that Justice of 
Appeal  Basten’s  reasoning  was  incorrect  in  these  respects, particularly  ‘as  to  whether  s  5D  demands  a  
rigid  separation  of  physical  and  policy  considerations  in  assessing  causation’,  his  Honour  was  willing  to  
accept the position put forward by Allsop P, and on either approach would have still denied liability on 
the facts: at 66 072 [181]. 
66  [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 051 [39]. 
67  Ibid 66 045–50 [10]–[32] (Allsop P), 66 071–72 [173]–[175] (Basten JA). 
68  Ibid 66 071 [173]. See also at 66 047 [16] (Allsop P). 
69  Ibid 66 047 [14]. President Allsop further stated: 
It is undoubted that the duty is a single comprehensive duty, but the harm for which the doctor should be 
held liable is the just and appropriate consequences of his or her breach of failing to warn of inherent 
risks. That, however, should not extend to harm from risks that the patient was willing to hazard, whether 
through an express choice or as found had their disclosure been made. This limits recovery to what was an 
unacceptable risk (or risks) and harm therefrom that has (or have) not been the subject of a warning: at 66 
048 [19]. 
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Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley’s  dissent  on  scope  of  liability  was  also  grounded  in  
an analysis of how causation principles should be coherent with the scope and 
content of the duty of care. P923F70P According to her Honour, the purpose of the duty to 
warn of material risks was to enable patients to make fully informed decisions 
concerning the risk of surgery, and Wallace was deprived of this opportunity as a 
result  of  Kam’s  failure  to  warn  of  both material risks. Consequently, by focusing 
upon an overall risk of treatment that was unacceptable to a patient (due to their 
lack of knowledge of one or more material risks), rather than upon the exposure 
of patients to an unacceptable risk of the particular physical harm that occurred, 
Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley’s  view  of  the  duty’s  purpose  was  ultimately  wider  than  
that of Allsop P P924F71 P and the High Court. P925F72P Her Honour stated that: 
where there is more than one material risk, and a finding is made that a plaintiff 
would not have undergone surgery if warned of other material risks, it is difficult 
to see reasons in logic or policy why a negligent doctor should not be liable 
notwithstanding that a different risk eventuated. P926F73 
Therefore, assuming Wallace would not have had the procedure if also 
warned  of  the  paralysis  risk,  Beazley  JA  judged  it  ‘appropriate  that  the  scope  of  
the  defendant’s  liability  extend  to the  harm  in  fact  caused’. P927F74 
 
C   The High Court 
The decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by a 
unanimous High Court judgment (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler, and 
Keane  JJ).  Similarly  to  Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley’s  dissent,  the Court noted that 
the   duty   in   question   protected   a   patient’s   right   to   decide   whether   or   not   to  
undergo   treatment  and   that   ‘the  common   law  recognis[ed]  not  only   the   right  of  
the patient to choose but the need for the patient to be adequately informed  
in order  to  be  able  to  make  that  choice  rationally’. P928F75P Nevertheless, this statement 
was accompanied by a caveat. The Court recognised that the elements of duty 
and  causation   are   intended   to   serve  different   functions,   ‘the   former   imposing   a  
forward-looking rule of conduct; the latter imposing a backward-looking 
attribution  of   responsibility   for  breach  of   the   rule’. P929F76P The Court, unlike Beazley 
JA, considered that, although it may appear to uphold the performance of  
                                                 
70  Ibid 66 066–7 [144]–[151].  
71  Ibid 66 047 [17]. 
72  See below nn 86–9 and accompanying text. 
73  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 067 [148] (Beazley JA). Her Honour did however 
recognise that it may  be  inappropriate  ‘for  the  scope  of  the  defendant’s  negligent  failure  to  warn  of  [a]  
risk  to  extend  to  …  different  harm’  where  that  ‘risk,  although  material,  has  relatively  minor  
consequences’:  at  66  067  [149]. 
74  Ibid 66 067 [150]. In doing so, her Honour adopts statements made in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 
232, 238 (Gaudron J), 256–7 (Gummow J) and Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 461 
(Gummow J): Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 067 [147]. 
75  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 380 . 
76  Ibid 387. 
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a   medical   practitioner’s   duty   to   warn, P930F 77 P it   is   ‘not   necessarily   appropriate’   to  
attribute   every   form   of   physical   injury   suffered   by   a   patient   to   a   doctor’s   
breach, simply because factual causation can be established. P931F78 P Rather,   ‘policy  
considerations that inform the imposition of a  particular  duty  …  may  operate  to  
deny liability for particular harm that is caused by a particular breach of that 
duty’.P932F79 
In addressing causation under the statutory test provided by section 5D of the 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), the High Court emphasised that, although 
typically overlooked in previous common law decisions where policy 
considerations and value judgments have been made and considered when 
deciding causation as an issue of fact, P933F80P the element of factual causation is now 
considered separately from such normative aspects of causation, which instead 
fall for consideration under scope of liability. P934F81 P As such, in examining factual 
causation in the circumstances of Wallace, the High Court confirmed that a 
determination   ‘in   accordance with [section] 5D(1)(a) involves nothing more or 
less  than  the  application  of  a  “but  for”  test’, P935F82 P which will be established whenever 
a patient can demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that they have 
‘sustained,  as  a  consequence  of  having  chosen  to  undergo  the  medical  treatment,  
physical injury which the patient would not have sustained if warned of all 
material   risks’. P936F 83 P Similarly to the Court of Appeal, the High Court therefore 
concluded  that  factual  causation  could  be  established  on  the  assumption  that  ‘but  
for’  Kam’s   failure   to  disclose  all   risks,   the  claimant  would  not  have  undergone  
the procedure at all and would not have then sustained neurapraxia. P937F84 
Turning then to the normative considerations required by scope of  
liability and the issue of whether or not liability for the neurapraxia should be 
imposed on Kam, the High Court was persuaded by the argument that Wallace 
should not be compensated for acceptable risks. P938F85P Influenced by the reasoning of  
                                                 
77  Ibid. French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ further stated: 
[T]he policy of the law in imposing the duty on the negligent party will ordinarily be furthered by holding 
the negligent party liable for all harm  that  occurs  in  fact  …  if  the  harm  was  of  a  kind  the  risk  of  which  it  
was the duty of the negligent party to use reasonable care and skill to avoid: at 386. 
78  Ibid 387. See also Paul v Cooke (2013) 85 NSWLR 167, 189, 194 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA 
agreeing).  The  ‘policy’  argument  that  ‘negligent  medical  practitioners  should  be  liable  for  harm  which  is  
causally  connected  with  their  breach  …  ignores  the  subtractive  effect  of  s  5D(1)(b)  and  of  the  previous  
doctrines developed by the law to constrain the limits of liability for negligence which inform its 
operation’:  at  194  (Leeming  JA). 
79  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
80  Ibid 381. See further above nn 30–6 and accompanying text. 
81  Ibid 383. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid (emphasis added). 
84  Ibid 379–80, 387. 
85  Ibid 388. 
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Allsop P, P939F 86 P the Court held that the policy of the law was not to protect the 
patient’s   right to choose in a general sense, P940F87 P nor was it to protect the patient 
from exposure to undisclosed risks. P941F88P The Court instead held that the purpose of 
the   duty   to  warn  was   to   ‘enable   the   patient  …   “to   avoid   the   occurrence   of  …  
particular physical injury the risk of which [the] patient [was] not prepared to 
accept”’. P942F89P Based on this reasoning, it was concluded that the risk of paralysis 
was distinct from and did not affect the risk of neurapraxia. P943F 90 P Therefore, as 
Wallace would have been willing to hazard the risk of neurapraxia alone (by 
continuing with the procedure), he did not sustain physical injury the risk of 
which was unacceptable to him and should not be compensated for it. P944F91 
The reasoning underpinning this determination of the case, by the High Court 
of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal, will now be analysed 
more closely. 
 
IV   ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING IN WALLACE 
The question of whether, upon failing to warn of multiple material risks, a 
medical  practitioner’s  liability  extends  to  an  occurrence of harm the risk of which 
(in isolation) a patient may be willing to accept, is indeed complex. It is therefore 
unsurprising that Wallace was fundamentally decided upon the basis of policy 
considerations concerning the interrelation between the purpose of the duty to 
warn   and   the   protection   of   a   patient’s   right   to   decision-making autonomy. 
Accordingly, against a backdrop of other jurisprudence in this field, this Part 
commences by examining the implications of Wallace for a structured 
consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases under the civil 
liability   legislation.   It   then   investigates   the   decision’s   impact   on   patient   rights  
protection and the classification of risk, before considering whether it 
                                                 
86  Ibid 390. See also:  
The duty and the rule of responsibility are not to protect the patient from the risk of an uninformed 
decision; they are not to protect the integrity of the decision ... They are to protect the patient from harm 
from material inherent risks that are unacceptable to him or her: Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [14] (Allsop P). 
87  Discussed further below Part IV(B). 
88  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 381. Cf Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 067 
[148] (Beazley JA). 
89  Wallace v Kam (2013)  250  CLR  375,  381  (citations  omitted).  ‘The  underlying  policy  is  rather  to  protect  
the patient from the occurrence of physical injury the risk of  which  is  unacceptable  to  the  patient’: at 390 
(French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
90  Ibid 388–9 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See also Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust 
Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047–48 [17]–[18], 66 049 [21], 66 049 [26], 66 050 [30]–[31] (Allsop P), 66 
070 [169], 66 071 [172] (Basten JA). 
91  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 389–91. 
2014 Medical Negligence, Causation and Liability for Non-disclosure of Risk 987 
corresponds with the way in which individual patients may make decisions 
concerning serious medical procedures. 
In doing so, it seeks to highlight that the reasoning offered in Wallace failed 
to consider a potentially significant aspect of such cases. The essence of 
Wallace’s   submission  was   that   ‘all the inherent material risks of the proposed 
surgery were relevant to his decision-making’. P945F92P Although perhaps reflective of 
how the case proceeded on appeal, P946F93P in our view, the majority reasoning does not, 
within the ambit of the appropriate scope of liability set by their Honours, 
sufficiently  consider  whether  ‘the  total  impact  of  the  risk  this  man  was  facing  in  
undergoing this surgery’ P947F94P might reasonably have had a bearing upon his found 
willingness to chance particular physical injury in the form of the neurapraxia 
suffered. Their Honours only discuss that, because they were not medically 
cumulative, the risks required separation.P948F95 P As such, any effect of the risk of 
paralysis  upon  Wallace’s  willingness  to  chance  neurapraxia  was  not  considered.  
Rather, it was to be held irrelevant to the pivotal issue of whether Wallace 
sustained  a  ‘physical  injury  the  risk  of  which  [was]  unacceptable’  to  him. P949F96P This 
argument is explored further below. P950F97 
 
A   A Causation Framework for Non-Disclosure Cases 
For the purpose of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (and its equivalent in 
other jurisdictions), P951F98P Wallace confirms that a decision under section 5D(1)(a), 
‘that  negligence  was  a  necessary  condition  of  the  occurrence  of  harm’  is  entirely  
                                                 
92  Ian  Wallace,  ‘Appellant’s  Amended  Submissions’,  Submission  in  Wallace v Kam, S307/2012, 1 
November 2012, [35] (emphasis added). See also Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 
050, 66 051 [39] (Beazley JA), 66 068 [157] (Basten JA). 
93  Because  the  medical  practitioner’s  failure  to  warn  of  the  risk  of  paralysis  was  considered to be causally 
irrelevant at trial, Harrison J did not address the significance of this risk being disclosed in conjunction 
with the risk of neurapraxia. Although it was assumed that knowledge of the paralysis would have 
precluded  the  procedure’s  occurrence,  no  findings  were  ever  made  as  to  the  patient’s  likely  response  if  
warned of both risks: see, eg, above nn 59–63 and accompanying text; Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 046 [11], 66 049 [22] (Allsop P), 66 067 [153] (Beazley JA), 66 068 [157], 66 071 
[174] (Basten JA); Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 379–80 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler 
and Keane JJ).  
94  Ian  Wallace,  ‘Appellant’s  Amended  Submissions’,  Submission  in  Wallace v Kam, S307/2012, 1 
November 2012, [38] (citations omitted).  
95  See above n 90; below nn 223–7, 260 and accompanying text.  
96  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 389–90 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See 
also at 381, 390–1; Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [14], 66 047–48 [17]–
[19], 66 049 [21] (Allsop P), 66 071 [172] (Basten JA). 
97  See below Part IV(D). 
98  See above n 25.  
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factual  and  is  to  be  decided  on  a  ‘but  for’  basis. P952F99P The decision also confirms that 
a determination of scope of liability pursuant to sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) is 
‘entirely  normative’,  requiring  a  discrete  consideration  of  ‘whether  or  not,  and  if  
so  why,  responsibility  for  the  harm  should  be  imposed  on  the  negligent  party’. P953F100 P 
This approach aligns with statements made in the statutory context in Strong v 
Woolworths Ltd,P954F 101 P and at common law by McHugh J in March v E & MH 
Stramare Pty Ltd,P955F102P that   ‘the   “but   for”   test   should   be   seen   as   the   test   of   legal  
causation’  and  that  ‘[a]ny  other  rule  limiting  responsibility  for damage caused by 
a wrongful act or omission should be recognized as a policy-based rule 
concerned   with   remoteness   of   damage’, P956F103 P or the extent to which a defendant 
ought to be liable. 
Scope  of  liability  therefore  places  a  limit  on  a  defendant’s  accountability for 
harm, in circumstances where a historical factual connection P957F104P between the harm 
and   the   defendant’s   negligence,   or   breach   of   duty,   has   already   been   shown   to  
exist. P958F105 P Consequently, it operates as a line drawing exercise to determine where a 
claimant’s  recovery  should  cease,  by  requiring  a  court  to  explicitly  consider  if  – 
based on notions of moral responsibility, common sense, value judgments or 
                                                 
99  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See also 
Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 044–45 [3]–[4] (Allsop P). Cf Basten JA who 
appeared to accept the potential for factual causation, under s 5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), to be influenced by normative judgment: see above n 65; Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 069 [163]–[164], 66 071–72 [175], 66 072 [181]. 
100  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See also 
Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 044–45 [4], 66 046 [12] (Allsop P). Cf Paul v 
Cooke (2012) 85 NSWLR 167, where it was considered that: 
It would be most surprising if scope of liability, which is central to establishing the limits of negligence, 
was confined to purely normative considerations …  There  is  to  my  mind  no  basis  in  the  statute  or  any  
decision on it to support the notion that the strength of the causal connection (or any other factual matter 
relevant  to  factual  causation)  is  irrelevant  to  the  determination  of  what  is  ‘appropriate’:  at 192 (Leeming 
JA). 
 See also at 172 (Ward JA agreeing), 172 (Basten JA). 
101  (2012) 246 CLR 182, 190–1 (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Adeels Palace Pty Ltd 
v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 440, 442–3 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
102  (1991) 171 CLR 506, 534 (while in the minority on this issue, McHugh J formed part of the majority in 
allowing  the  appeal  in  this  case).  See,  eg,  Mason  CJ,  who  stated  that  ‘[l]ike  McHugh  J,  I  would  allow  this  
appeal but my reasons for taking this course are rather different from those stated by his Honour as I do 
not  accept  that  the  “but  for”  (causa sine qua non) test ever was or now should become the exclusive test 
of  causation  in  negligence  cases’:  at  508.   
103  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 534 (McHugh J). See also RP Balkin and J L R 
Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) 320. 
104  Whether established under s 5D(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) or exceptionally under s 
5D(2): see above nn 25, 47. 
105  See, eg, Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [15] (Allsop P). 
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policy P959F106 P – liability can be justifiably imposed upon a defendant. The element 
reflects  an  ‘instinctive  belief  that  a  person  should  not  be  liable  for  every  wrongful  
act or omission which is a necessary condition of the occurrence of the injury that 
befell   the   plaintiff’, P960F107P or, as stated in Wallace by the New South Wales Court  
of Appeal, a   conclusion   as   to   whether   in   the   circumstances   ‘posited   liability  
would   be   “unjust”,   “absurd”   or   “unacceptable”’. P961F108 P This may arise due to the 
‘tenuousness   of   the   factual   link   or   some   limitation   by   reference   to   the   rule   of  
responsibility involved’.P962F109P For example, assume that a passenger on a speeding 
motorcycle is injured when the sidecar in which they are travelling is struck by 
lightning. In these circumstances it might be considered quite unreal to accept a 
conclusion, under section 5D(1)(a), that the negligent driving (assuming that it 
was negligent to speed) was a necessary condition of the injury due to the fact 
that   ‘but   for’   the  speeding,   the  motorcycle  would  not  have  been  on   that  part  of  
the road at that point in time and would have missed the lightning strike. Rather, 
one might argue that such a finding should be rejected under sections 5D(1)(b) 
and (4) on the basis that the imposition of negligence liability for speeding is 
limited   to   only   protecting   persons   from   harm   ‘arising   in   certain familiar ways 
which  would  normally  be  regarded  as  the  risks  attendant  on  speeding’. P963F110 
Importantly   then,   ‘[q]uestions   of   causation   are   not   answered   in   a   legal  
vacuum’,   but   are   addressed   in   the   context   of   ‘the   legal   framework   in   which   
they  arise’. P964F111P Accordingly, given that the elements of the negligence action are 
                                                 
106  See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 243 (McHugh J); March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd 
(1991) 171 CLR 506, 523 (Deane J), 530–1 (McHugh J); Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–
101, 66 045–46 [10] (Allsop P). See also Leeming JA in Paul v Cooke, referring  to  the  ‘common  
experience  of  the  relevant  community’:  (2013)  85  NSWLR  167,  180  (citations  omitted).  See  also  at  172  
(Ward JA agreeing). 
107  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 243 (McHugh J). 
108  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 046 [12] (Allsop P). 
109  Ibid. See also Hayne J in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 283, who refers to the fact that the 
‘application  of  a  “but  for”  test  does  not  identify  what  might  be  called  the  “quality”  of  the  causal  
connection’.  A  weak  causal  connection  has  also  been  stated  to  be  ‘far  from  an  irrelevant  consideration  in  
determining whether it is appropriate for a defendant to be liable for the harm so caused’:  Paul v Cooke 
(2013) 85 NSWLR 167, 192–3 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing). 
110  H L A Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 122. In legal terms, the 
lightning strike, not being the very thing likely to occur as a result  of  the  defendant’s  wrongful  driving,  
might also be termed as constituting a novus actus interveniens: see, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 
232, 284 (Hayne J).  
111  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 238 (Gaudron J). 
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interrelated, P965F112P it has been observed that common sense ‘answers  to  questions  of  
causation  will  differ  according  to  the  purpose  for  which  the  question  is  asked’. P966F113 P 
In   particular,   ‘one   cannot   give   a   common   sense   answer   to   a   question   of   
causation for the purpose of attributing legal responsibility under some  
rule   without   knowing   the   purpose   and   scope   of   the   rule’. P967F114 P Consequently, as 
mentioned above, P968F 115 P although not determinative of causation, P969F 116 P one of the 
normative   factors   falling   under   a   consideration   of   ‘scope   of   liability’   is   an  
examination of the content and purpose of the legal rule or duty of care violated 
by the defendant – that is, the legal policy underpinning it and whether this 
supports a finding of liability. Such an approach is consistent with that adopted to 
determine causation for the purpose of statutory liability, for example, under the 
Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW). P970F117P Here liability is also influenced, although 
perhaps more decisively, P971F118P by  ‘statutory  subject,  scope  and  purpose’. P972F119 
The relationship between duty of care and scope of liability can be 
demonstrated, in a non-medical context, by Zanner v Zanner. P973F120P In this case, a 
child was manoeuvring a car into the carport of the family home when his foot 
slipped off the brake and onto the accelerator, thereby propelling the vehicle 
                                                 
112  In a failure to warn context, see, eg, Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 067 [147] 
(Beazley JA), 66 069 [164] (Basten JA); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 438 (Gleeson CJ), 
452, 458–9 (Gummow J), regarding the interrelation between the classification of a risk as material and 
causation,  particularly  given  that  the  factors  that  influence  a  court’s  decision  as  to  whether  a  risk  is  
material, such as its degree and severity, may also be relevant objective evidence when establishing 
causation and what the patient would have done had they known of that risk. See further below nn 141–
51 and accompanying text. See generally Tame v NSW (2002) 211 CLR 317, 349 (McHugh J); Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Grant Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 622 (Kirby J). 
113  Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22, 29 (Lord Hoffman).  
114  Ibid 31 (Lord Hoffman). See also Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 256 (Gummow J), 276 (Kirby J), 
285–6 (Hayne J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 460–1 (Gummow J). 
115  See above n 42 and accompanying text. 
116  ‘Describing  the  injury  as  “the  very  kind  of  thing”  which  was  the  subject  of  the  duty  must  not  be  permitted  
to  obscure  the  need  to  prove  factual  causation’:  Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 
442 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also Paul v Cooke (2013) 85 NSWLR 
167, 189, 194 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing). 
117  See, eg, Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568, 572, 581–90 
(McHugh J), 595–8 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 599 (Callinan J) (concerning whether an 
employee’s  injury  was  caused  by  a  vehicle  defect  pursuant  to  ss  3(1)  and  69(1)  of  the  Motor Accidents 
Act 1988 (NSW), such as to entitle their employer to an indemnity from Allianz under the Act). 
118  See, eg, Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 645, 650 (Kirby J), 653 (Callinan J) 
(requiring a determination of whether payments from a Travel Compensation Fund, established pursuant 
to the Travel Agents Act 1986 (NSW), to clients of a defaulting travel agent were recoverable under ss 42 
and 68 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) because they amounted to damage caused by the misleading 
or  deceptive  conduct  of  the  professionals  responsible  for  the  agent’s  financial  statements). 
119  Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 245 ALR 653, 674 (Kirby J). See also Travel Compensation 
Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 639–40 (Gleeson CJ), 642–4 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 644–5, 
648, 651–2 (Kirby J). 
120  (2010) 79 NSWLR 702. 
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forward into his mother. P974F121P Before the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Allsop 
P held that for the purpose of sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) of the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW): 
All relevant considerations that inform the content of the appropriate scope of the 
negligent  person’s  liability  and  responsibility  point  to  a  positive  conclusion  as  to 
causation and liability here. Injury to the mother was entirely foreseeable should 
negligence occur ... The content of the duty and the attenuated standard of care 
were directed to the exercise of care to avoid injury to the mother in the very 
manner that occurred  ...  Common  sense  would  attribute  the  mother’s  injury  to  the  
negligence of her son, as well as to her own negligence in putting herself in that 
position. P975F122 
Recognising  ‘that  it  would  be  a  rare  case  indeed  where  a  motor  vehicle  case  
attracted some   other   policy   consideration’, P976F123 P Tobias   JA   further   accepted   ‘that  
dangerous, potentially lethal machines such as motor vehicles must be driven 
with due care and attention. If they are not ... there was every reason as a matter 
of policy why [the driver]  should  be  held  responsible  for  the  harm’. P977F124P Relevant to 
the duty of care owed by medical practitioners, in Freidin v St Laurent an 
appellant  obstetrician  and  gynaecologist  argued  that  even  if  there  was  a  ‘physical  
connection’   between   his   failure   to   perform   an   episiotomy   and   the   mother’s  
injuries,  ‘there  was  no  legal  causal  connection’  because  ‘the  rationale  behind  the  
duty   to   perform   an   episiotomy  was   primarily   to   protect   the   baby’. P978F125P Rejecting 
this argument at common law, Chernov JA held that  ‘the  rationale  for  the  duty  of  
care that the appellant owed the respondent was not so narrow or unrelated to the 
injury  as   to  be  disregarded  for   the  purpose  of  determining  causation’. P979F126P Rather, 
‘the   appellant   owed   the   respondent   a   duty   of   care   that   was wide enough to 
include the duty to take all reasonable steps to preserve her health and wellbeing 
during   the   delivery   procedure’. P980F127P In Tabet v Gett, Kiefel J also acknowledged 
that   it   is   necessary   ‘to   understand   the   purpose   for   making   an   inquiry   about 
causation’  and  that   this  ‘may  require  value  judgments  and  policy  choices’  to  be  
made. P981F128 
Accordingly, by applying this framework to their causation analysis in 
Wallace, neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal P982F129P can be criticised, in 
general terms, for adopting a surprising or unorthodox approach to considering 
                                                 
121  Ibid 707. 
122  Ibid 706.  
123  Ibid  719  (Tobias  JA).  Eg,  ‘where  the  relevant  harm  is  only  remotely  connected  to  the defendant’s  
conduct’. 
124  Ibid 717. 
125  (2007) 17 VR 439, 451 (Chernov JA), 440 (Callaway JA agreeing), 441 (Buchanan JA agreeing). 
126  Ibid 451. 
127  Ibid 452 (Chernov JA). 
128  (2010) 240 CLR 537, 578 (in the context of determining causation on the basis of the loss of a chance of 
a better medical outcome and whether the common law should recognise such loss as damage for the 
purpose of a negligence action arising from patient mismanagement). 
129  See above nn 69–79, 85–91 and accompanying text. 
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the specific issue of whether a medical practitioner, consistent with the purpose 
of their duty, ought to be liable for failing to warn of multiple material risks 
where the risk that came home was one which, in isolation, the patient would 
have  accepted.  Indeed,  the  Courts’  scope  of  liability  methodology  under  section  
5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) has subsequently been applied in the 
area of negligent diagnosis by Paul v Cooke. P983F130P There, in confining the purpose of 
that   aspect   of   a  medical   practitioner’s   duty   of   care   to   protection   against   ‘harm  
that   can   [only]  be   avoided  or   alleviated  by  prompt  diagnosis’  or   treatment, P984F131P a 
radiologist’s   failure   to   detect   an   aneurysm was held not to have caused the 
claimant’s   disabilities   when   it   ruptured   intra-operatively following diagnosis 
three years later. This was because irrespective of the timing or type of operation 
inevitably required, the rupture risk was the same. P985F132P Wallace was again applied 
in Neville v Lam [No 3] in the context of a wrongful birth claim arising from a 
practitioner’s   failure   to   advise   of   the   potential   for   pregnancy   following  
endometrial ablation. P986F133 P Here, the New South Wales Supreme Court held that, 
had breach been established, P987F134P the content or purpose of the duty to advise was to 
prevent pregnancy, or the financial costs incurred as a result. P988F135 P Consequently, 
this   would   have   supported   a   finding   that   the   practitioner’s   scope   of   liability 
‘ordinarily’   extends   to   the   costs   incurred   by   the   patient   in   raising   their  
congenitally disabled child. P989F136 
Of perhaps more importance then, are the implications of Wallace’s analysis 
for a structured consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases, 
regardless of the number of risks involved. This is now considered in accordance 
with each stage, or element, of the causation inquiry. 
 
                                                 
130  (2013) 85 NSWLR  167.  In  terms  of  methodology,  Leeming  JA  stated  that  ‘in  Wallace  v  Kam  …  the High 
Court  has  confirmed  the  “limiting  principle”  that  “the  scope  of  liability  normally  does  not  extend  beyond  
liability for the occurrence of such harm the risk of which it was the duty of the negligent party to 
exercise  reasonable  care  and  skill  to  avoid”’:  at  191  (citations  omitted),  172  (Ward  JA  agreeing).  The  
High  Court’s  statements  were also affirmed in Neville v Lam [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 607, [175] (Beech-
Jones J). 
131  (2013) 85 NSWLR 167, 187 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing). See also at 172 (Basten JA), 188–9 
(Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing).  
132  Ibid 173, 189, 191–2, 194–5 (Leeming JA), 172 (Ward JA agreeing). 
133  [2014] NSWSC 607. 
134  Ibid [140]–[143] (Beech-Jones J). 
135  Ibid [189]–[191] (Beech-Jones J). 
136  Ibid [192]–[195] (Beech-Jones J). Although the damages awarded in such circumstances would be 
limited by s 71 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), to those additional costs associated with rearing or 
maintaining the child that flow from their disability, Beech-Jones  J  held  that  there  was  ‘nothing  in  the  
section or the secondary materials concerning its enactment [to] indicate that it was meant to operate 
upon section 5D(1)(b) so as to only allow recovery of the additional costs of raising a child with disability 
in those circumstances where the relevant negligent act materially contributed to the occurrence of the 
disability’:  Neville v Lam [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 607, [195].  
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1 Failure to Warn and Factual Causation 
Failure   to   warn   cases   ‘encounter   difficulties   of   causation   that   do not arise  
in   cases   of,   for   example,   a   negligent   physical   act   “causing”   injury’. P990F137 P This is 
because they involve the non-disclosure of material inherent risks, or significant 
risks, the nature, if not the degree, P991F 138 P of which are always present as an 
inseparable element of the treatment performed or forgone. P992F139P Their occurrence is 
not related to, or increased by, any positive act or omission in the performance of 
the  treatment  itself.  Consequently,  Cane  writes  that  ‘[i]n  this  central  sense  of  the 
word  “cause”,  failure  to  warn  of  risk  does  not  “cause”  the  materialisation  of  the  
risk  of  which  the  patient  ought  to  have  been  warned’.  The  medical  practitioner’s  
breach   of   duty   instead   ‘creates[s]   the   situation   in   which   an   extraordinary  
sequence of events  could  occur’. P993F140 
A consideration of factual causation in cases of non-disclosure focuses 
therefore upon the hypothetical question of what the particular patient would 
have done had a warning been given. P994F141P ‘In  terms  of  causation  theory,  the  critical 
fact  is  whether’,  on  the  balance  of  probabilities,  ‘but  for’  the  practitioner’s  failure  
to   warn,   ‘the   patient   would   have   taken   action   ...   that   would   have   avoided   the  
harm  suffered’. P995F142P Whilst  this  must  ‘be  determined  subjectively  in  the  light  of  all  
relevant  circumstances’, P996F143P under section 5D(3)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), P997F144P any statement made by the patient, either in or out of court, P998F145P about 
what they would have done is inadmissible, except to the extent (if any) that such 
statement is against their interest. In cases involving a failure to disclose the 
material risks inherent in medical procedures, it is perhaps understandable that a 
patient suffering from an unexpected complication would be likely to state 
directly in the course of expensive litigation that they would not have had a 
procedure if they had known of its risk(s). P999F146 P Given this, when determining a 
patient’s   likely   course   of   conduct,   objective   factors   such   as   ‘the   remoteness   of  
the   risk’   and   the   patient’s   ‘need’   or   ‘desire   for   treatment’   and   the   ‘alternatives  
                                                 
137  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 460 (Gummow J). See generally Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust 
Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 071–72 [175] (Basten JA). 
138  See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 241 (Gaudron J), discussed below n 183 and 
accompanying text.  
139  Ibid 241 (Gaudron J). See further above n 3 and accompanying text. 
140  Peter  Cane,  ‘A  Warning  about  Causation’  (1999)  115  Law Quarterly Review 21, 22. See also Wallace v 
Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 068 [158] (Basten JA). 
141  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 462 (Gummow J). 
142  Ibid 449 (McHugh J). See also Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383–4 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, 
Gageler and Keane JJ). 
143  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383–4 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ).  
144  See also Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(3)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(3)(b); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 13(3)(b). 
145  See, eg, KT v PLG [2006] NSWSC 919, [42]–[44] (Simpson J) (negligently performed surgical 
termination of pregnancy). 
146  See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 272 (Kirby J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 
444 (McHugh J), 462 (Gummow J), 485 (Kirby J), 501–2, 504–5 (Callinan J). See further above n 26. 
994 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(3) 
available’;;   ‘previous   and   later   procedures   undertaken’;;   ‘degree   of   faith’   in   
the medical professional; and independent knowledge, P1000F147P are usually viewed as 
more compelling. P1001F 148 P Nevertheless,   as   the   exclusion   of   a   claimant’s   evidence  
under   section  5D(3)   is  of   ‘quite   limited’   scope, P1002F149P a  patient’s  own   testimony  on  
matters   such   as   their   general   ‘position,   beliefs   and   fears’ P1003F 150 P at the time of a 
procedure, although in their favour, would remain admissible. Evidence of third 
parties, about what a particular patient would have done in the circumstances, is 
also not excluded by the Act, but may be given little weight. P1004F151 
Since the common law duty of care owed by a medical practitioner to their 
patient   is   a   ‘single   comprehensive   duty’, P1005F 152 P Wallace determined that factual 
causation   has   to   be   decided   on   the   basis   of   the   entirety   of   the   defendant’s  
breach. P1006F153 P In cases similarly involving a failure to warn of multiple risks of a 
single medical procedure, this requires a consideration of what the claimant 
would have done if all risks had been disclosed (not just the risk that materialised 
and caused their harm). P1007F154P As noted by Allsop P: 
The potential benefits and risks of undergoing that operation were all part of  
the relevant information, as a whole, which the appellant was entitled to have in 
order to make up his mind, after weighing all relevant information, as to whether 
to seek the benefits of the procedure, by hazarding such risks as it entailed. It is 
unrealistic to posit a coherent factual enquiry for the purposes of [section] 
5D(1)(a) by only asking what would have been his decision had he only been told 
part of what he should have been told. The duty was one comprehensive duty. If it 
                                                 
147  Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127, [81] (Basten JA), [1] (Beazley JA agreeing), citing Addison, 
above n 9, 184–93, affd Harris v Bellemore [2010] NSWSC 176, [147] (McCallum J).  
148  See, eg, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 443–50 (McHugh J). 
149  Neal v Ambulance Service of NSW [2008] Aust Torts Reports ¶81–988, 62 612 [41] (Basten JA), 62 604 
[1] (Tobias JA agreeing), 62 618 [67] (Handley JJA agreeing) (alleged negligence of ambulance officers 
in failing to advise police that the intoxicated claimant needed hospital treatment). 
150  Ibid 62 612 [42] (Basten JA). See also at 62 610–14 [34]–[49] (Basten JA). 
151  See, eg, ibid 62 612 [40]; Livingstone v Mitchell [2007] NSWSC 1477, [46]–[47]  (Walmsley  AJ)  (a  son’s  
evidence as to what his parents would have done in a conveyancing transaction had the defendant not 
breached a duty of care to ascertain whether there was an adequate contract of insurance in relation to a 
property, although of limited probative value, was not excluded).  
152  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 380 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See 
further Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 483 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ), discussed above n 1 and accompanying text.  
153  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ); Wallace v 
Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 045 [8] (Allsop P).  
154  See discussion above nn 64–6 and nn 82–84 and accompanying text. In Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital 
(1998) 17 NSWLR 553, 559, Kirby P held that the subjective test of causation required a consideration of 
‘whether  Mrs  Ellis  would  have  undergone  the  operation  had  she  been  fully  informed  of  its  risks  both  of  
paralysis  (remote)  and  failure  to  relieve  her  pain  (more  substantial)’.  See  also  at  561  (Kirby  P),  590  
(Samuels JA), 607 (Meagher JA agreeing).  
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was  breached,  that  occurred,  on  the  appellant’s  case,  by  failing  to  tell  him  of  both  
possible  risks  … P1008F155 
Based on this view, it is arguable that in a case concerning the non-disclosure 
of material risks – where different or multiple independent medical procedures 
are contemplated and harm occurs – there may be some justification for 
considering factual causation separately in relation to each procedure. P1009F156P But the 
situation may be otherwise where the procedures are related, such that the 
performance of one is contingent upon the performance of another. 
Consequently, in non-disclosure cases, factual causation will be established 
where the patient, if warned of all material risks would not have proceeded with a 
treatment or medical procedure: P1010F157 
x at all, and thus would not have suffered the harm that occurred; P1011F158P or 
x at the same time and place, or in the same circumstances – while they 
may have still undergone the procedure at some later time or in different 
circumstances, the evidence must be such that they would not, on the 
balance of probabilities, P1012F159P have then suffered the harm. 
The latter situation covers cases like Chappel v Hart where it was found that, 
had the patient known of the risk prior to the procedure taking place, she would 
not have refused the surgery completely but would have postponed the procedure 
                                                 
155  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 045 [8]. See also at 66 045 [14] (Allsop P), 66 
065–66 [138], 66 065–66 [143]–[144] (Beazley JA); Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383, 387 
(French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). Cf Basten JA, who (as discussed at above n 63), 
appears  to  reject  the  application  of  the  ‘single  comprehensive  duty’  notion  to  the  issue  of  factual  
causation: Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 068–69 [161], 66 070 [169]–[170], 66 
071  [173].  Instead,  his  Honour  confines  the  phrase’s  relevance  to  a  consideration,  as  occurred  in  Rogers v 
Whitaker, of whether the principle from Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All 
ER 118 (namely, that a medical practitioner is not negligent if they act according to practice accepted as 
proper  by  a  responsible  body  of  medical  opinion),  applies  to  all  aspects  of  a  medical  practitioner’s  duty  of  
care. Accordingly, Basten JA potentially accepts that the obligation to provide information and advice in 
the case of multiple risks requires a distinct duty, and therefore a separate consideration of factual 
causation, for each risk. 
156  See, eg, Gover v South Australia (1986) 39 SASR 543, 563, where Cox J stated that:  
different types of operation and their respective risks have to be reckoned separately. They were separate 
procedures,  and  one  could  have  been  performed  without  the  other  …  In  the  circumstances  I  do  not  think  
that it can be said that the entropion and trichiasis that resulted from the canthoplasty were caused, in the 
relevant sense, by the failure to warn the plaintiff of a blepharoplasty risk. 
157  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 384 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See also 
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 247 (McHugh J). 
158  See, eg, Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 (failure to advise of sympathetic ophthalmia following 
eye surgery); Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127 (failure to warn of the risks of scrotum swelling, 
chronic pain from nerve entrapment and embolism as a result of a hernia operation); Hribar v Wells 
(1995) 64 SASR 129 (failure to warn of permanent nerve damage and numbness to tongue and lips 
following surgery to correct a malocclusion); Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 
(non-disclosure of a risk of paralysis and failure to relieve pain following surgery). 
159  See above n 28 and accompanying text. 
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so that it could be performed by a more experienced surgeon. P1013F160P In this instance, 
the undisclosed risk of infection and voice damage due to oesophagus 
perforation, whilst material, was held to be improbable, P1014F 161 P and the causation 
argument founded upon the postponement of the surgery was based upon 
evidence that the probability of avoiding the physical harm in question was more 
likely than not if the procedure was delayed. P1015F162P Therefore,  on  a  ‘but   for’   test  of  
causation, had the surgery occurred at a different time the patient would almost 
certainly not have suffered the injury that she did.P1016F163P Consequently,  the  surgeon’s  
failure to advise would have been a necessary condition of the occurrence of her 
harm. P1017F164 P However, factual causation will not be established if the patient, even if 
warned of all material risks, would have undergone the treatment that was in fact 
                                                 
160  (1998) 195 CLR 232, 237 (Gaudron J), 242 (McHugh J), 267 (Kirby J), 281 (Hayne J). See also 
Henderson v Low [2001] QSC 496, [37] (Dutney J), where a failure to warn of a rare, or slight, risk of 
incontinence  and  impotence  following  a  laminectomy  was  held  to  have  caused  the  claimant’s  harm  in  
circumstances  where,  if  advised,  they  ‘would  have  at  least  deferred  surgery  until  other possibilities had 
been  tried’.  See  also  at  [21],  [30]  (Dutney  J). 
161  Indeed, being less than one per cent, the risk was held to be so speculative that it did not warrant a 
discount in the damages awarded on account of the probability that the risk may have occurred in any 
event  independently  of  the  defendant’s  negligence:  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 241–2 
(Gaudron J), 262–3 (Gummow J), 278 (Kirby J).  
162  This argument can be distinguished from the assertion that instead of suffering physical injury, a patient 
is seeking compensation for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome (or the loss of an 
opportunity to postpone their procedure and have it performed by a more experienced surgeon, who via 
their increased skill and experience may have performed the surgery with less risk of complication). Loss 
of chance claims were often pleaded when there was doubt as to whether a patient could establish, on the 
balance of probabilities, a sufficient causal connection between their actual physical harm and a 
practitioner’s  medical  negligence  or  risk  non-disclosure. However, in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 
232, such claims were rejected by a majority of the High  Court  in  the  context  of  a  practitioner’s  failure  to  
warn. Because the duty only obliged a practitioner to advise a patient of the material risks of physical 
injury associated with treatment, and not of other surgeons practicing in the field, the relevant damage 
was said to be limited to physical harm sustained in the form of the risk that was non-disclosed: at 239 
(Gaudron J), 252 (McHugh J), 288–9 (Hayne J); cf 274–5, 278–9 (Kirby J). See also Rosenberg v 
Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 464–5 (Gummow J). Arguably, this might now be considered as a 
justification relevant to scope of liability: see, eg, above nn 104–36 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, 
more recently, in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, the High Court concluded that, particularly in cases 
involving physical injury, the common law of Australia does not recognise the loss of a chance of a better 
outcome as damage for the purpose of a medical negligence claim: at 554, 559 (Gummow ACJ), 580, 
586–7 (Kiefel J), 564 (Hayne and Bell JJ agreeing), 575 (Crennan J agreeing). 
163  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 240 (Gaudron J), 250–1 (McHugh J), 257 (Gummow J), 267, 277 
(Kirby J), 283–4 (Hayne J). See also Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 465 (Gummow J).  
164  The case was decided before the enactment of the civil liability legislation. See further above n 25 and 
accompanying text. 
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chosen, at the same time and place, P1018F 165 P or in circumstances where it is more 
probable than not that the harm might still occur. 
In Wallace, the   finding   of   factual   causation   was   assisted   by   the   courts’  
assumption that a warning of the more significant paralysis risk would have 
resulted in surgery refusal. P1019F166 P Accordingly, given that the fulfilment of factual 
causation,  or   the  ‘but  for’  test,   in  that  case  was  rather  weak  and  did  not  answer  
the normative question of whether  liability  ought  to  be  imposed,  the  ‘satisfaction  
of   legal   causation’ P1020F167P also required a consideration of scope of liability. It was 
around  this  question  that  liability  turned,  and  it  is  here  that  the  decision’s  impact  
is most strongly felt. 
 
2 Failure to Warn and Scope of Liability 
As discussed above, P1021F168 P the conclusion of the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal in Wallace was ultimately based upon findings as to the extent to which 
the practitioner ought to be liable having regard to the purpose or policy behind 
the legal duty violated. P1022F169 P The object of the duty to warn of risks inherent in 
undergoing or forgoing surgery or other interventions was stated as being  
to   guard   against   ‘the   occurrence   of   physical injury the risk of which  
[was] unacceptable to  the  patient’. P1023F170P It was stated that although the duty protects 
patients   by   holding   medical   practitioners   ‘responsible   for   the   harm   that   may  
result  from  material  inherent  risks  that  were  not  the  subject  of  warning’, P1024F171P it does 
not  (even  if  factual  causation  is  established)  ‘extend  to  harm  from  risks  that  the  
patient was willing to hazard, whether through an express choice or as found had 
their   disclosure   been   made’. P1025F 172 P Moreover, as discussed below, P1026F 173 P the   courts’  
findings  concerning   the  scope  of  Dr  Kam’s   liability  were  greatly   influenced  by  
the view that both non-disclosed risks were separate and distinct – the 
assumption being that the risks would have been evaluated independently by the 
patient. 
                                                 
165  See, eg, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 (failure to warn of a risk of temporomandibular joint 
complications after the performance of a sagittal split osteotomy); Harris v Bellemore [2010] NSWSC 
176 (failure to advise of the risk of joint stiffness and loss of knee flexibility following the Ilizarov 
technique of limb lengthening), where factual causation was not established as according to objective 
evidence the patient would have proceeded with the surgery at the same time and place such that their 
harm would have still then occurred. 
166  See above nn 63–6, 84 and accompanying text. 
167  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ).  
168  See above nn 69–79, 85–91 and accompanying text.  
169  Indeed,  even  Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley’s  dissent  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  was  based  upon  the  duty’s  
purpose, albeit a wider view of it.  
170  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 390 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) (emphasis 
added). See also at 381. 
171  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aus Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [14] (Allsop P). 
172  Ibid 66 048 [19] (Allsop P). 
173  See below nn 223–30 and accompanying text. 
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For   the  purpose  of  scope  of   liability  and   the  demarcation  of  a  practitioner’s  
legal responsibility, the policy underlying the duty to warn prescribed by Wallace 
therefore requires both a correlation between the physical injury claimed and the 
treatment’s  inherent non-disclosed  risk  of  harm;;  and  the  patient’s  non-acceptance 
of that risk. This has significant explanatory power. First, in terms of the 
correlation  required,  as  the  unknown  material  risk  must  have  eventuated  and  ‘be  
related in a physical sense to the  injury  that  was  suffered’, P1027F174P Kam could not be 
liable   solely   on   the   basis   of   exposing   Wallace   ‘to   an   unacceptable   risk   of  
catastrophic   paralysis’ P1028F175P as this harm did not ensue. Importantly, this rationale 
also explains why damages are limited  ‘to  sequelae  which  are  related  directly’  to  
the material risk of which the practitioner should have warned, P1029F 176 P and why 
liability is not found for other detriments consequent upon a procedure but 
unrelated to that risk. For example, in the commonly cited situation of physical 
injury in the form of lightning strike, P1030F 177 P or misapplied anaesthetic P1031F 178 P in an 
operation that would not have occurred had the patient been advised of its risks, 
despite factual causation being established, the surgeon will not be liable because 
the physical injury arising is beyond that which, in furtherance of the duty to 
warn of risks inherent in the surgery performed, the practitioner is required to 
disclose. P1032F179P Even when the required correlation between harm and non-disclosed 
risk is present, it may be insufficient to impose liability. For example, in Chappel 
v Hart, in the context of a failure to warn of damage to the laryngeal nerve, 
Hayne J stated that: 
                                                 
174  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 460 (Gummow J), affd Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts 
Reports ¶82–101, 66 059 [95] (Beazley JA), 66 070 [165]–[166] (Basten JA). See also Elbourne v Gibbs 
[2006]  NSWCA  127,  [65]  (Basten  JA),  [1]  (Beazley  JA  agreeing);;  ‘For  particular  physical injury 
sustained by a patient as a result of medical treatment the patient has chosen to have carried out to be 
compensable, it must be determined to have been caused by the particular failure of the medical 
practitioner’:  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 381 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane 
JJ).  
175  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 390 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
176  See, eg, Hribar v Wells (1995) 64 SASR 129, 147 (Duggan J). See also at 130 (King CJ); cf 143–6 
(Bollen J).  
177  See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 285 (Hayne J). 
178  See, eg, ibid 257 (Gummow J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 460 (Gummow J); Wallace v 
Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 046 [12] (Allsop P).  
179  See, eg, Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385–6 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
See also above n 110 and accompanying text. In the context of misapplied anaesthetic, this conclusion is 
reached on the basis that it: is itself separate from the surgical procedure and not a material or inherent 
risk of it; is such an obvious and general procedural risk that it is already known; or, being immaterial to 
the  patient’s  decision,  does  not  require  disclosure:  see  A  R  Braun,  L  Skene  and  A  F  Merry,  ‘Informed  
Consent  for  Anaesthesia  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand’  (2010)  38  Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 809, 
810; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, 879, 889 (Lord 
Scarman), 891 (Lord Diplock), 897 (Lord Bridge) 895 (Lord Keith agreeing). Statute in some 
jurisdictions  does  however  preserve  a  professional’s  duty  to  warn  of  obvious  risks:  Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) s 5H(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 15(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 38(2); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5O(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 17(2). 
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If it were enough, it would follow that if the operating theatre had been struck by 
lightning and the respondent had suffered damage to the laryngeal nerve (because 
of the resulting power surge affecting the diathermy equipment being used in the 
operation) the appellant would be liable but that he would not if the power surge 
caused burns to her body.P1033F180 
In these circumstances, the event is not the very risk, or a normal incident of 
it, against which there was the duty to warn or safeguard the patient. The very 
risk was the risk of laryngeal nerve damage inherent in the medical procedure, 
not that same risk inherent in an act of God. In reality, such a strike would be 
said   to   preclude   a   practitioner’s   liability,   irrespective   of   the   injury   caused,   on  
normative grounds P1034F181P under sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) of the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) – specifically, on the basis of it being a novus actus interveniens, or 
an intervening or successive cause that is not the very thing likely to occur as a 
result  of  the  defendant’s  wrongful  failure  to  advise. P1035F182 
Secondly, in terms of its requirement that patients be exposed to a particular 
physical harm, the risk of which is unacceptable to them, Wallace justifies the 
imposition of liability in circumstances like Chappel v Hart. In that case, 
although the nature of the risk in question (oesophagus perforation and 
consequent infection) was the same no matter when, where or by whom the 
surgery was performed, the degree of risk was considered, on the balance of 
probabilities,   to   diminish   ‘with   the   skill   and   experience   of   the   surgeon  
concerned’.P1036F183P Although it was inevitable that the patient would need to have the 
procedure and accept the chance of harm at some point, it was also found that, 
had the risk been known, the patient would have consulted a more experienced 
practitioner. P1037F184P Accordingly, the non-disclosure, by precluding the opportunity for 
the surgery to be delayed, arguably still exposed the patient to a risk of 
perforation and infection that was unacceptable. Similarly, in Shead v Hooley, P1038F185 P 
liability for the failure to warn of a potential for gastroparesis was supported by a 
finding   that   ‘if   Ms   Hooley   had   sought   a   second   opinion,   the   risks   would   
have been reduced, if only because there would have been a later gastroscopy 
                                                 
180  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 285. 
181  See above nn 37–43 and accompanying text. 
182  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 284 (Hayne J). See also Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports 
¶82–101, 66 046 [13] (Allsop P); Ipp Report, above n 5, 115. 
183  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 241 (Gaudron J). See also at 239–40 (Gaudron J), 277–8 (Kirby J). 
However, Gummow J considered that  ‘[t]o  make  good  her  case  and  to  obtain  the  award  of  damages  she  
recovered, Mrs Hart was not required to negative the proposition that any later treatment would have been 
attended  with  the  same  or  a  greater  degree  of  risk’:  at  260.  The  dissenting  judgments of McHugh and 
Hayne JJ held that later performance of the surgery by another would not have decreased the risk, rather 
the  patient  had  only  been  subjected  to  ‘a  class  of  risk’  that  she  would  have  been  exposed  to  anyway:  at  
245 (McHugh J). See also at 244–6, 250 (McHugh J), 287, 289–90 (Hayne J). 
184  Ibid 237 (Gaudron J), 242 (McHugh J), 267 (Kirby J), 281 (Hayne J). 
185  [2000] NSWCA 362. 
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which  would  or  may  have  shown  that   the  chronic  ulcer  was  healing’. P1039F186P Indeed, 
jurisprudence  appears  to  accept  ‘that,  if  the  operation  would  have  taken  place  [at  
a later time] and the risks been essentially the same, the plaintiff would have 
failed  to  establish  that  the  harm  was  caused  by  the  breach  of  duty’. P1040F187P However, 
in Chappel v Hart,  Kirby  J  did  consider  that  in  the  absence  of  ‘statistical  or  other  
evidence’,  diminished  risk  could  be   implied  by  ‘intuition  and  commonsense’. P1041F188 P 
While no specific finding of a reduction of risk was made in Reid v Basson, a 
non-disclosed risk of nerve damage following lymph gland removal surgery was 
held  causative  of  the  patient’s  loss because, had the risk been known, they would 
not have had the procedure at the hands of a doctor in Barcaldine but at a major 
Brisbane hospital. P1042F189 
Once normative or policy choices are made under sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) 
for a particular category of  case,   they  must  be  maintained  by  the  courts  ‘unless  
confronted  and  overruled’. P1043F190P Accordingly, as it has been claimed that Wallace’s  
scope  of  liability  findings  suggest  a  narrowing  of  the  legal  duty’s  purpose  or  its  
protection of patient rights, P1044F191P in  the  context  of  actions  concerning  a  practitioner’s  
failure to warn, it is important to consider this idea further. 
 
B   Patient Rights and Autonomy: A Change in Policy? 
In Rogers v Whitaker, the High Court confirmed   that   ‘the   “duty   to   warn”  
arises from   the   patient’s   right   to   know   of  material   risks,   a   right  which   in   turn  
arises  from  the  patient’s  right   to  decide  for  himself  or  herself  whether  or  not   to  
submit  to  the  medical  treatment  proposed’. P1045F192P Later, in Chappel v Hart, the duty 
was described as   ‘a   rigorous   legal   obligation’   so   ‘conducive   to   respect   for   the  
                                                 
186  Ibid [68] (Davies AJA), [1] (Mason P agreeing), [8] (Beazley JA agreeing). See also at [69] (Davies 
AJA).  
187  Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127, [82] (Basten JA), [1] (Beazley JA agreeing). There it was held 
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the relevant warnings been given. On balance, the evidence suggests  the  contrary’:  at  [104]  (Basten  JA).  
Cf Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, discussed in Part V below, where causation was found even 
though, had the surgery been postponed and performed at a later date or by a different doctor, the one to 
two per cent risk of neurological damage, or cauda equina syndrome, would have remained: at 142, 146–
7 (Lord Steyn), 154–5, 161–3 (Lord Hope), 164–6  (Lord  Walker)  (‘Chester’). 
188  (1998) 195 CLR 232, 277. 
189  [2000] QSC 310, [10]–[11] (Dutney J). 
190  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 385 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See 
generally Neville v Lam [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 607, [174] (Beech-Jones J). 
191  See  generally  Thomas  Faunce,  ‘Disclosure  of  Material  Risk  as  Systems-Error Tragedy: Wallace v Kam’  
(2013) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 53.  
192  (1992) 175 CLR 479, 482 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), affd Chappel v Hart 
(1998) 195 CLR 232, 256–7 (Gummow J). In Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 477 (Kirby J) 
(citations  omitted),  a  patient’s  ‘right  to  determine  what  shall  be  done  with  his  own  body’  was  stated  to  be  
‘[f]undamental  to  the  formulation  adopted  by  [the]  Court  in  Rogers’.  See  also  Jeremy  Clarke,  ‘Causation  
in Chappel v Hart:  Common  Sense  or  Coincidence?’  (1999)  6  Journal of Law and Medicine 335, 337–8. 
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integrity   of   the   patient   and   better   health   care’   that, P1046F193 P when it is not complied 
with,  ‘it  should  occasion  no  surprise  that  legal  consequences  follow’. P1047F194P The Ipp 
Report considered that liability for non-disclosed risks might be rationalised on 
the   basis   of   the   ‘responsibilities   of   doctors   to   their   patients’,   stating   that  
according to Chappel v Hart,   ‘the   doctor   should   be   liable   because   the   risk   
that materialised was precisely the risk about which (in discharge of the reactive 
duty)   he   should   have   warned   the   patient’. P1048F 195 P Waddams forms the view that 
compensation  was  justified  on  the  basis  of  Hart’s  ‘intangible  loss’  to  ‘autonomy  
and  dignity  for  not  being  permitted  to  make  a  fully  informed  decision’. P1049F196 
If these comments are read as implying that, in order to promote the 
performance of the duty and the protection of informed patient decision-making, 
liability ought to be imposed as soon as failure to warn of a material risk is 
shown,  the  courts’  findings  in  WallaceP1050F197P – as to the purpose of the duty of care 
and its application to deny liability – may, at first glance, seem to represent a 
tightening   of   the   High   Court’s   own   previously   stated   objects   of   negligence  
liability in this area. They may also appear to de-emphasise patient autonomy or 
the protection of this right.  Indeed,  one’s  right  to  decision-making autonomy may 
initially seem weakened by a rule that denies liability, despite the non-disclosure 
of multiple risks of injury, on the basis that although it would have been avoided 
had all information been known, the only risk of harm that occurred was one 
which, in isolation, the patient was willing to accept. 
Although the approach in Wallace may  appear  to  disregard  the  patient’s  right  
to determine whether or not to run non-disclosed risks, it must be remembered 
that   the   medical   practitioner’s   duty   to   advise   of   material   risks   inherent   in  
undergoing or forgoing treatment takes the form of an action in negligence and 
                                                 
193  (1998) 195 CLR 232, 272 (Kirby J). 
194  Ibid 277 (Kirby J). See also Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 480, 484 (Kirby J). 
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Hope), 163–6 (Lord Walker). In Chappel v Hart (1998)  195  CLR  232,  262,  Gummow  J  stated  that  ‘the  
obtaining of adequate advice as to the risks involved was a central concern of Mrs Hart in seeking and 
agreeing to undergo the surgical procedure in question. It would, in the circumstances of the case, be 
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(Kirby J). 
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not battery. P1051F198P It therefore requires a claimant to establish the causation of damage 
or harm as an essential element. P1052F199P It is not then like an action in trespass which, 
being actionable per se or without proof of damage, is naturally more attuned to 
protecting against infringements of rights in the abstract, such as the right to 
bodily integrity.P1053F200P Justice Hayne arguably acknowledged this in Chappel v Hart 
when stating that it was not: 
enough to say that a purpose of this area of the law is to promote reasonable 
conduct by medical practitioners and, particularly, the giving of advice necessary 
to enable people to make their own decisions about their lives. Enlarging the 
circumstances in which damages will be awarded if there has been a negligent 
failure  …  may  well  tend  to  promote  the  giving  of  fuller  advice.  But  the  ambit  of  
the liability is not to be decided only according to whether enlarging that ambit 
will promote careful conduct. The question of causation must still be answered. 
                                                 
198  In relation to medical treatment, battery actions are  ‘confined  to  cases  where  surgery  or  treatment  has  
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and Archibald JJ agreeing); F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 190 (King CJ); Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital 
(1989) 17 NSWLR 553, 578 (Samuels JA), 607 (Meagher JA agreeing); Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 
CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ); Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 
223 [48]–[50], [61]–[64] (Basten JA); Reeves v R [2013] NSWCCA 34 (in the context of criminal 
medical assault). 
199  See, eg, Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 254 (Gummow J); Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. 
‘[N]owhere  is  it  suggested  that  the  requirement  for  damage  itself  can  be  dispensed  with.  Liability  based  
upon  breach  of  duty  of  care  without  proven  loss  or  harm  will  not  suffice’:  at  578  (Kiefel  J),  564  (Hayne  
and Bell JJ agreeing), 575 (Crennan J agreeing). 
200  See generally Braun, Skene and Merry, above n 179,  812.  See  also  Danuta  Mendelson,  ‘Liability  for  
Negligent  Failure  to  Disclose  Medical  Risks’  (2001)  8  Journal of Law and Medicine 358, 359–61; Reibl v 
Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880, 890–2 (Laskin CJ) (Martland, Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre and 
Chouinard JJ agreeing), discussed above n 198. The necessity to establish an element of tangible harm in 
negligence claims may be supported by the causation provisions in s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld): see, eg, Tina  Cockburn  and  Bill  Madden,  ‘Intentional  Torts  Claims  in  Medical  Cases’  (2006)  13  
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What is the connection between the negligent act or omission and the damage 
sustained? P1054F201 
Additionally, actions in negligence demand an assessment of the 
reasonableness of conduct P1055F 202 P which, in the context of a failure to advise 
independent of negligent mistreatment, P1056F 203 P necessarily   reconciles   a   patient’s  
interest in informed decision-making against the imposition upon practitioners of 
‘excessively   onerous   obligations   of   foresight   and   care’. P1057F204P Consequently, it has 
been  said  that  expressions  such  as  a  ‘right  of  self-determination’,  while  perhaps  
suitable   to   trespass,   are   ‘of   little   assistance   in   the balancing process that is 
involved’  in  negligence. P1058F205 
With  this  in  mind,  a  mere  breach  of  duty  or  infringement  of  one’s  autonomy  
or right to choose has never guaranteed a successful negligence action such as to 
independently warrant recovery in Wallace.   One’s   right   to   choose   is   not   an  
interest that, absent more quantifiable P1059F206P or actionable damage, is recognised by 
negligence law as being capable of direct or absolute protection. P1060F207 P Rather, in 
Australian medical negligence cases, claims for the loss of an opportunity to 
pursue a better therapeutic outcome are prohibited P1061F208P on the basis that the damage 
sustained  is  not  the  patient’s  loss  of  an  ability  to  act  to  ‘avoid  or  minimise’  a  risk  
of injury, but rather any physical injury suffered as a result. P1062F209P Previous failure to 
warn proceedings have also confirmed that compensation is awarded for actual 
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person with such a right to do anything he or she does not choose to do inflicts a form of legal harm. That 
is  a  loose  concept’:  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, 16 (Gleeson CJ). 
208  Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 554, 559 (Gummow ACJ), 580–2, 586–7 (Kiefel J), 564 (Hayne and 
Bell JJ agreeing), 575 (Crennan J agreeing).  
209  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 239 (Gaudron J). See also at 252 (McHugh J); Naxakis v Western 
General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269, 280 (Gaudron J); Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 464 
(Gummow J); Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 559 (Gummow ACJ), 581–2, 586–7 (Kiefel J), 564 
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damage to the person or the consequential occurrence of economic loss or 
expenditure.P1063F210 P Since negligence cannot enforce mere rights, compensation has 
not   been   provided   for   the   patient’s   unknowing   exposure   to   extra   risk, P1064F211P or for 
‘the  risk  that  the  patient  will  make  an  uninformed  decision  or  choose  the  wrong  
option,  although  that  may  well  underpin  the  rationale  behind  the  duty’. P1065F212P Neither 
can   a   patient   sue   ‘for   the   costs   of,   and   inconvenience   involved   in,   an   entirely  
successful operation, in which none of the inherent risks that should have been 
the  subject  of  a  warning  came  home’. P1066F213 
As such, Wallace was   justified   in   finding   it   ‘consistent  with   the  underlying  
purpose   of   the   imposition   of   the   duty   to   warn’,   that   ‘the   damage   suffered   by   
the patient that the common law makes compensable is not impairment of  
the   patient’s   right   to   choose’,   exposure   to   an   ‘undisclosed   risk’, P1067F214P or failure to 
‘protect   the   integrity  of   the  decision’. P1068F215P The Court of Appeal instead cautioned 
against  the  uncritical  use  of  such  concepts  ‘which  ought  to  be  valuable  currency,  
but which are susceptible to rhetorical inflation’.P1069F 216 P Wallace confirms that in 
cases involving the non-disclosure of inherent material risk(s) of treatment, the 
law of negligence, particularly for the purpose of formulating an appropriate 
scope of liability in causation, does not directly protect the right to patient 
autonomy, or informed decision-making, against intrusion. Instead, such a right 
remains to be promoted only indirectly or incidentally by the duty (after the 
causation of actionable harm is shown), in the sense that without the provision of 
information   ‘[a]ny   “choice”   by   the   patient,   in   respect   of   such   procedures  …   is  
“meaningless”’. P1070F217 
It should be noted, however, that Wallace was not a case where the claimant 
was arguing that he should be compensated for the mere infringement of his 
autonomy; physical injury was in fact sustained. Because Wallace did sustain a 
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217  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 465 (Kirby J), citing statements made in Rogers v Whitaker 
(1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). See also Wallace v 
Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 380–1 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). Cf the position 
under English law discussed below Part V. 
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recognised form of harm, P1071F218P there was a possibility that the courts might find in 
his favour without departing from a consideration of established causation 
principles. The issue, then, revolved around the question of why scope of liability 
should not extend to encompass the particular form of harm that was in fact 
sustained.   It   was   here   that   the   High   Court   stated   that   it   was   ‘not   necessarily  
appropriate for the liability of the medical practitioner to extend to every physical 
injury   to   a   patient  …   about  which   it   is   the   duty   of   the  medical   practitioner   to  
warn’.P1072F219P What qualifies as actionable damage in this way has been recognised as 
being  ‘a  question  of  policy  largely  defined  by  the  “duty”  rules’. P1073F220P Consequently, 
the Court concluded that it was the purpose of the law of negligence that the duty 
to   inform   of   material   risks   is   only   ‘imposed   to   enable   the   patient   to   choose  
whether or not to run those inherent risks  and  thereby  “to  avoid  the  occurrence  of  
the particular physical injury the risk of which [the] patient is not prepared to 
accept”’. P1074F221 
Nevertheless,   if   viewed   in   terms   of   autonomy   promotion,   a   patient’s  
informed decision-making is arguably only minimally impacted by non-
disclosure of a single material risk, which is totally independent of any other risk 
and   which,   if   warned   of,   would   have   been   accepted   by   virtue   of   the   patient’s  
continuance with the procedure. Here, as the provision of data is inconsequential 
to   the  patient’s   assessment  or  undertaking  of   risk,   the  enablement  of   relevantly  
enlightened  choice  is  preserved  by  the  law’s  exclusion  of  liability.  In  addition  to  
not satisfying factual causation, P1075F222 P as it does not involve exposure to physical 
injury the risk of which was unacceptable to the patient, neither is the imposition 
of liability supported by Wallace’s  formulation  of  the  purpose  of  the  duty  of  care  
in terms of scope of liability. By contrast, in circumstances involving multiple 
risks, where the patient alleges that had one of the risks been disclosed they 
would not have undergone the procedure at all or at that time, it is arguable that 
after Wallace the efficacy of any indirect protection of patient autonomy has been 
eroded, or will certainly depend on how the risk (or risks) is (or are) defined. 
 
C   The Nature and Classification of Risks: Distinct Versus Cumulative 
In Wallace, it  was   recognised   that   the   patient’s   decision   regarding  whether   
or not to proceed with the surgery needed to be made on the basis of an 
                                                 
218  Namely, physical injury in the form of neurapraxia: see generally Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 
390 (French CJ, Crennan,  Kiefel,  Gageler  and  Keane  JJ).  Such  ‘personal  injury’  is  also  recognised  within  
the  Civil  Liability  Legislation’s  definition  of  ‘harm’:  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5; Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld) s 8, sch 2; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 43; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 3; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) s 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 9; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 40. 
219  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 387 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
220  Fleming, above n 201, 216. 
221  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 381 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) (citations 
omitted). See also at 390; Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [14] (Allsop P). 
222  See above n 165 and accompanying text. 
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assessment  of  all  of  the  risks,  ‘which  should  have  been  disclosed  …  in  one  body  
of   disclosure’. P1076F223P Importantly   however,   it   was   stated   that   the   courts’   normative  
findings under scope of liability were greatly influenced  by  ‘the  distinct  nature  of  
the  material   risks   about   which   Dr   Kam   failed   to   warn  Mr  Wallace’. P1077F224 P In this 
case,   ‘[t]here   was   no   suggestion   that   the   neurapraxia   was  medically   related   to   
the   risk   of   catastrophic   paralysis’, P1078F225 P rather   they   were   treated   as   ‘distinct   risks   
of   different   physical   injuries’. P1079F226P On this basis, given that Wallace would have 
proceeded with the surgery had he known of the risk of neurapraxia, it could not 
be shown that non-disclosure of the more catastrophic paralysis risk (estimated to 
occur in around five per cent of cases) exposed him to a type of physical injury 
(in terms of the actual harm, or neurapraxia, suffered) the risk of which was 
unacceptable to him.P1080F227P Rather,  ‘[w]hat  was  not  acceptable was the combination 
of all the risks such that the procedure became   unacceptable’. P1081F228 P Accordingly, 
while   Wallace   may   have   objected   to   the   ‘level   of   risk   of   physical   injury  
occurring’   overall,   unlike   Beazley   JA, P1082F229 P the High Court held that the   ‘risk   of  
physical injury that comes home in such a case is not necessarily the risk of 
[particular] physical injury that  is  unacceptable  to  the  patient’. P1083F230 
The case therefore highlights the importance – at least in terms of future 
cases involving a failure to warn of multiple risks – of the distinction between 
distinct and cumulative risks. Distinct risks are perils that are not medically 
related, such as the risk of a fractured jaw and the risk of a dry socket due to the 
removal of wisdom teeth. With distinct risks, as stated by Basten JA in Wallace, 
‘[a]lthough  the  patient  has  but  one  decision  to  make,  the  factors  to  be  placed  into  
the   balance   in   making   that   decision   …   are   separate   and   each   has   its   own  
weight’.P1084F231P As such, Wallace would seem to provide authority for the proposition 
that, in a case concerning a failure to warn of multiple risks, the non-disclosure of 
one   distinct   risk   will   never   impact   upon   the   patient’s   decision   as   to   whether  
another is acceptable. P1085F232 P Cumulative risks however, are those which cannot be 
‘disentangled’   from   each   other.   These   latter   risks   may   have   a   ‘bearing   on   the  
                                                 
223  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 049 [21] (Allsop P). See also at 66 045 [8] 
(Allsop P). 
224  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 388 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). See also 
at 390–1.  See  further,  ‘[o]f  importance  to  that  equiparation  is  the  separateness  and  distinctiveness  of  the  
risks, which the argument of the appellant below and in this Court  implicitly  recognised’:  Wallace v Kam 
[2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 050 [28] (Allsop P). 
225  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 049 [21] (Allsop P). See also at 66 050 [31] 
(Allsop P). 
226  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 389 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ).  
227  See above nn 67–9, 85–91 and accompanying text. 
228  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [17] (Allsop P) (emphasis added). 
229  See above nn 70–4 and accompanying text. 
230  Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 389 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) (emphasis 
added). See also at 388. 
231  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 070 [170]. 
232  Ibid 66 047 [16]–[17] (Allsop P). However, this is subject to the discussion at below Part IV(D). 
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likelihood   of   the   other   occurring’   or   have   a   ‘relevant   medical   relationship   or  
connection’, P1086F 233 P such that the non-disclosure of one or more cumulative risks 
affects the acceptability of the others or of the degree of particular injury that 
might occur. P1087F 234 P President Allsop states that, hypothetically on the facts of 
Wallace: 
If the occurrence of neurapraxia was disclosed that risk may have been acceptable 
in itself with its usual consequences; but if neurapraxia could, in some cases, 
trigger other catastrophic neurological consequences it would be impossible to say 
that   the   risk   of   neurapraxia   had   been   accepted,   even   though   only   the   ‘usual’  
consequences and discomfitures of it had manifested themselves. P1088F235 
In considering the distinction between distinct and cumulative as outlined in 
Wallace, it is possible to refer to a number of other cases that have involved 
cumulative risks, despite the fact that the courts have not always explicitly 
classified the risks in that way. An example of further disclosure bearing on the 
acceptability of a risk of oesophagus perforation is illustrated by Chappel v Hart. 
There,  injury  to  a  patient’s  voice  resulted  from  a  ‘sequence  of  the  perforation,  the  
infection (mediastinitis), the damage to the laryngeal nerve and the paralysis of 
the   right   vocal   cord’. P1089F236 P Only the risk of perforation had been mentioned as a 
complication, P1090F237P and it was held that given the interconnected nature of each risk, 
it   was   ‘the   relevant   conjunction   of   circumstances’   that   ‘should   have   been   the  
subject  of  any  adequate  warning’. P1091F238P In Rogers v Whitaker, the non-disclosed risk 
of  sympathetic  ophthalmia  occurring  as  a  result  of  the  patient’s  eye  surgery  was  
‘once  in  approximately  14,000  such  procedures,  although  there  was  also  evidence  
that the chance of occurrence was slightly greater when, as [was the case in 
Rogers],  there  had  been  an  earlier  penetrating  injury  to  the  eye  operated  upon’. P1092F239 P 
Therefore, had it been disclosed, in order for a patient to accept it, both the 
probability of the risk of ophthalmia and the circumstances of the individual 
patient which had increased the risk occurring would need to have been known. 
Similarly, in Wallace, the  claimant’s  weight  was  said  to  have  increased  both  the  
probability of the risk of neurapraxia and its magnitude, P1093F240P while in Bloodworth v 
South Coast Regional Health Authority, a non-disclosed risk of abdominal 
surgery  was   held   to   increase   with   both   the   practitioner’s   inexperience   and   the  
slightness of the patient, such that all risk components should have been 
                                                 
233  Ibid 66 047 [18] (Allsop P). See also at 66 050 [30] (Allsop P), 66 071 [172] (Basten JA); Amaca Pty Ltd 
v Ellis (2010) 240 CLR 111, 131–2 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
234  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [17] (Allsop P). See also Wallace v Kam 
(2013) 250 CLR 375, 389 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
235  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 047 [17] (Allsop P). 
236  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 254 (Gummow J). 
237  Ibid. 
238  Ibid  257  (Gummow  J).  The  risks  were  described  by  his  Honour  as  ‘cumulative’:  at  261. 
239  (1992) 175 CLR 479, 482 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
240  Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [47] (Harrison J); Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust 
Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 052 [46] (Beazley JA).  
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revealed. P1094F241 P In Bloodworth, the material risk in question was expressed as the 
danger   of   ‘sustaining   abdominal   injury   as   a   result   of   the   blind   insertion   of   the  
veress  needle  and  the  trocar’  in  laparoscopic  surgery. P1095F242P Consequently, as the risk 
of injury due to such sharp instruments was affected by both patient build and 
practitioner experience, in this context the risk components, post-Wallace, would 
be cumulative. In Moyes v Lothian Health Board,   whilst   a   patient’s  
hypersensitivity had not caused their stroke following an angiography, it was a 
‘cumulative’  factor  ‘aggravating  the  risks’  of  stroke  such  that  it  was  held  to  be  an  
‘added  risk’  of  which  the  patient  should  have  been  warned. P1096F243P Lord Caplan noted 
that: 
If we were to suppose a situation where an operation would give rise to a 1 percent 
risk of serious complication in the ordinary case but where there could be four 
other special factors each adding a further 1 percent to the risk, a patient to whom 
all five factors applied might have a 5 percent risk rather than the 1 percent risk of 
the average person. It is perfectly conceivable that a patient might be prepared to 
accept the risk of one in 100 but not be prepared to face up to a risk of one in 
20.P1097F244 
In these circumstances then, failure to disclose one component of the risk 
would expose the patient, in total, to a greater extent, likelihood, or risk of 
particular physical injury than they may have been willing to accept on the basis 
of any component known. Consequently, while perhaps seeming unlikely, cases 
involving cumulative risks do have the potential to occur quite often. As such, in 
future actions based upon a failure to disclose material risk, there may be 
particular benefit in forming a cumulative risk argument, if such an argument 
then allows the patient to show that the physical injury sustained was regarded as 
an unacceptable risk. P1098F 245 P However, the ability to form such an argument will 
depend upon the following factors. 
 
1 The Description of Multiple Risks 
Whether non-disclosure  amounts  to  ‘one  interconnected failure to disclose all 
relevant  inherent  risks  will  depend  upon  a  factual  enquiry’ P1099F246P that is likely to be 
significantly assisted by medical evidence and the science of risk relationships. 
                                                 
241  [2004] NSWSC 234, [141]–[159]  (Mathews  AJ)  (‘Bloodworth’). 
242  Ibid [144] (Mathews AJ). 
243  1990 SLT 444, 447 (Lord Caplan). On the facts, however, liability was not found as it could not be 
established that such a warning would have prevented the operation. 
244  Ibid. 
245  As discussed above nn 162, 208 and accompanying text, following Tabet v Gett such actions cannot take 
the form of a loss of a chance claim. That is, they cannot be argued on the basis that the non-disclosure of 
all cumulative risk components has led the patient to make decisions about a procedure that has deprived 
them of the chance of a better medical outcome such that it is that lost chance, rather than physical injury 
actually sustained, that they are seeking compensation for: Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 554, 559 
(Gummow ACJ), 580–2, 586–7 (Kiefel J), 564 (Hayne and Bell JJ agreeing), 575 (Crennan J agreeing). 
246  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 045 [8] (Allsop P). See also at 66 047 [18] 
(Allsop P), 66 070 [170] (Basten JA). 
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However, the enquiry is also likely to be influenced by the way in which the risk 
is   ‘described   to   the   patient   and   the   way   in   which   it   will   be   understood   and  
assessed’. P1100F247P For example, in Wallace, the supposedly distinct risks were, in fact, 
both forms of nerve damage. The first, bilateral femoral neurapraxia, was a risk 
of   ‘local   nerve   damage   to   the   thigh’   due   to   lying   for   an   extended   period  
throughout the surgery. P1101F248P The second, a five per cent risk of paralysis, arose due 
to   the   ‘risk   of   injury   to   the   spinal   nerves   during   the   course   of   the   operation  
causing   paralysis’. P1102F249P Indeed, in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem 
Royal Hospital, it was recognised that a general warning of a one to two percent 
risk of nerve root damage in the area of the operation encompassed the potential 
for spinal cord damage, such that there was no separate obligation to advise  
of the latter, more specific, risk. P1103F250P Alternatively,  as  Wallace’s   injury  due   to   the  
neurapraxia   was   described   as   ‘incomplete   paraplegia’, P1104F 251 P both risks might be 
understood in terms of paraplegia. 
As a consequence, an issue may arise where risks – although on one view 
distinct and separate – are grouped together as a body of similar risks by the 
medical practitioner when describing them as part of their duty to advise. For 
example,  given  that  ‘clinicians  tend  to  be  overly  general  in  their  descriptions  of  
some  risks’, P1105F252P suppose that the practitioner in Wallace did provide a risk warning 
but  framed  it  more  broadly  in  terms  of  an  ‘x’  per  cent chance  of  ‘nerve  damage’.  
The warning given is a single warning that encompasses both neurapraxia and 
paralysis, instead of a number of distinct warnings of the differing physical 
manifestations or substances of the particular risk in question. Would the risks 
now be cumulative, such that the non-disclosure of the paralysis component 
would mean that the patient would be exposed to a substantially greater risk of 
nerve damage that was now unacceptable to them, and succeed in their claim, 
even if the risk of neurapraxia was accepted? Should an, albeit indirect, 
protection of patient autonomy P1106F253P be forced to turn upon such fine distinctions or 
matters   of   linguistics?  When  practitioners’   conversations   surrounding   risks   and  
consent   are   routinely   ‘customized to   suit   individual  patients’, P1107F254P should liability 
also depend upon, for example, a patient expressing a particular concern (for 
some reason) about sustaining nerve damage and therefore being advised of the 
                                                 
247  Ibid 66 070 [170] (Basten JA).  
248  Ibid 66 050–51 [36] (Beazley JA). 
249  Ibid.  
250  [1985] AC 871, 902–5 (Lord Templeman). See also at 891–2 (Lord Diplock), 900–1 (Lord Bridge), 895 
(Lord Keith agreeing). 
251  See,  eg,  Ian  Wallace,  ‘Appellant’s  Amended  Submissions’,  Submission  in  Wallace v Kam, S307/2012, 1 
November 2012, [21]. 
252  Bismark et al, above n 10, 3. 
253  See above Part IV(B). 
254  Christopher  F  C  Jordens,  Kathleen  Montgomery  and  Rowena  Forsyth,  ‘Trouble  in  the  Gap:  A  Bioethical  
and Sociological Analysis of Informed Consent for High-Risk  Medical  Procedures’  (2013)  10  Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 67, 72. 
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risks in those terms? The reasoning in Wallace is unlikely to assist in resolving 
such questions, due to the fact that the only view expressed was that the risks  
in that case, being distinct, should have been considered separately. P1108F 255 P The 
possibility that they could have been cumulative, based on the way in which the 
risks  were  described,  was  therefore  beyond  the  courts’  contemplation. 
 
2 The  Patient’s  Subjective  Circumstances 
In terms of subjective characteristics, Allsop P in Wallace considered that the 
relationship of risks to each other also   depends   upon   ‘the   attitude   or  
background’ P1109F256P or  ‘known  relevant  connection[s]  for  the  patient’. P1110F257P Based on this 
reasoning, it can be argued, in a similar way to assessing whether a risk is 
material, P1111F258P that an assessment of whether risks are cumulative may be influenced 
by   a   patient’s   subjective   medical   and   non-medical traits. If this is possible, 
individual patient circumstances may result in a collection of risks being classed 
as cumulative for that individual, even if this would not be so for another patient. 
For example, consider the situation of an opera singer about to have throat 
surgery. Due to their circumstances (like the principal education officer in 
Chappel v Hart), P1112F259P the patient is particularly concerned about possible damage to 
their  voice.  As  a  result  of  the  surgery  there  are  two  distinct  risks,  ‘x’  and  ‘y’.  If  
both  risks  have  the  potential  to  affect  the  patient’s  voice,  are  they  now,  given  the  
situation of the particular patient, cumulative? Notably, this argument is not 
intended, necessarily, to be the same as the linguistic argument referred to above, 
which instead turns on the way in which the risks are presented (for instance as 
‘risks   to  voice’)  rather   than  on  how  they  may  appear   to  be   interconnected  from  
the viewpoint of the particular patient. 
As such, the ability of Wallace’s distinction – between distinct and 
cumulative risks – to provide clarity in practice, must be questioned. As 
discussed below, it must also be queried whether such a differentiation between 
types of risk actually accords with the way in which patients make decisions. 
 
D   Wallace and the Complex Nature of Patient Decision-Making 
The categorisation of both non-disclosed material risks in Wallace as distinct 
meant that the medically unrelated risk of paralysis was deemed irrelevant to the 
                                                 
255  See above nn 90, 223–7 and accompanying text. 
256  Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 66 045 [8].  
257  Ibid 66 047–8 [18]. See also at 66 050 [30] (Allsop P).  
258  See above nn 5–9 and accompanying text. See, eg, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 458, 
where Gummow J  stated  that  ‘if  …  as  in  Rogers, the patient is already blind in one eye and stands to lose 
sight  entirely,  that  risk  becomes  one  of  an  altogether  greater  magnitude’.   
259  (1998) 195 CLR 232, 253 (Gummow J), 266 (Kirby J). Indeed, the patient in Chappel v Hart was 
described  as  ‘a  person  for  whom  the  potential  consequences  of  damage  to  her  voice  were  more  significant  
than  the  “statistical”  risk’:  at  257  (Gummow  J). 
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issue   of   whether   Wallace’s   neurapraxia   was   unacceptable   to   him. P1113F 260 P Such an 
approach then relies on an assumption that, in the case of multiple non-disclosed 
material risks, a patient will analyse each distinct risk separately and in isolation 
from another when making decisions about medical procedures. It also equates to 
a view that the relationship between distinct material risks is always irrelevant 
when patients weigh information during the consent process. 
It might be correct to form the view that, during the decision-making process, 
a patient may turn their mind to a separate consideration of the physical 
consequences of each distinct risk should one or more of those risks come home. 
However, in circumstances where all risks are material to the patient, Wallace’s  
approach does not pay any regard to the way in which, within the ambit of the 
appropriate scope of liability set by their Honours, the patient may weigh all 
material information together. Patient decision-making about whether to undergo 
or forgo medical treatment has been described as a multifaceted phenomenon P1114F261 P 
which   ‘typically   involve   complex   trade-offs between probable harms and 
benefits’.P1115F262P The issue therefore arises as to whether it is just to conclude that the 
non-disclosure of one distinct risk (of particular physical injury) will never 
impact  upon  a  patient’s  decision  regarding  the  acceptability of another. P1116F263P  
It can be questioned whether, in Wallace, Basten JA was justified  
in   reasoning   that,   while   patients   contemplate   a   procedure’s   cumulative   
risks together in decision-making, they consider each medically unrelated 
discrete risk separately by giving it its own weight. P1117F264P Notably, his Honour admits 
that  this  is  a  ‘somewhat  idealised  paradigm’. P1118F265P According to previous High Court 
jurisprudence, patients often understand the disclosure of risk information only 
imperfectly. P1119F266P Lord Caplan, in Moyes v Lothian Health Board, also noted that 
‘[t]he  ordinary  person  who  has  to  consider  whether  or  not  to  have  an  operation  is  
                                                 
260  See above nn 223–7 and accompanying text. 
261  See,  eg,  Amin  Hakim,  ‘Perception  of  Risk  and  Benefit in Patient-Centered  Communication  and  Care’  
(2011) 3 Journal of Patient Intelligence 39. 
262  Jordens, Montgomery and Forsyth, above n 254, 70 (observation made in the context of studying high 
risk medical procedures, namely bone marrow transplantation). See also Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 
880, 899 (Laskin CJ) (Martland, Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre and Chouinard JJ agreeing). 
263  This is considered to be a different argument to that made by Beazley JA (in dissent) in Wallace v Kam 
[2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101.  While  her  Honour  focused  upon  the  patient’s  acceptance  of  the  
overall risks of treatment such that the procedure became unacceptable, this was distinguished by the 
majority judges in the Court of Appeal and the High Court: see above nn 70–4, 86–9, 223–30 and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, our question is framed within the ambit of the appropriate scope of 
liability, or purpose of the duty of care, formulated by the majority in asking whether the non-disclosure 
of distinct risks can subject a patient to a particular physical injury the risk of which is unacceptable to 
them: see above nn 168–70 and accompanying text. 
264  See above n 231 ff and accompanying text. See also Wallace v Kam [2012] Aust Torts Reports ¶82–101, 
66 047 [16]–[17] (Allsop P). 
265  Ibid 66 070 [170] (Basten JA). 
266  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 478 (Kirby J). 
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not interested in the exact pathological genesis of the various complications 
which can occur but rather in the  nature  and  extent  of  the  risk’. P1120F267 
This acknowledges that patients may not make the type of distinction 
between distinct and cumulative risks proposed by Wallace. Rather, it appears 
counterintuitive to the way in which patients make decisions to say that distinct 
risks   of   different   physical   injuries   will   never   impact   upon   an   individual’s  
acceptance of other distinct risks, and that instead patients only make decisions 
by  saying  (in  effect):  ‘yes  I  will  accept  risk  “a”;;  yes  I  will  accept  risk  “b”;;  yes I 
will  accept  risk  “c”;;  so  yes  I  will  have  the  procedure’. 
After   studying  patients’   information  use   in  deciding  between   treatments   for  
symptomatic carotid artery disease, Bergus, Levin and Elstein concluded that, as 
subjects learned more about a treatment’s   risks   and  benefits,   their   ‘favorability  
ratings’,   or   likelihood   of   going   ahead   with   a   treatment,   declined;; P1121F268 P and   ‘that,  
overall,  risks  affected  judgments  more  than  benefits’. P1122F269P This does not necessarily 
support the view that subjective characteristics may result in patients treating 
risks as cumulative. P1123F270P Nonetheless, if it is the situation that the more a patient 
learns   about   risks,   the   ‘more   conservative’   their   choices   become, P1124F271P then surely 
one might argue that the more distinct risks,  ‘d’,  ‘e’,  ‘f’  and  so  on,  that  a  patient  
has   to   consider,   the   similarly   less   likely   it   is   that   a   risk   of   physical   injury   ‘a’  
might be acceptable to them. 
The following example illustrates this further: Sue is considering cosmetic 
surgery in the form of an abdominoplasty, or tummy tuck. The surgery is purely 
elective as there is no medical necessity to have it. Possible risks of the procedure 
include: infection; numbness; fluid accumulation; hematoma; skin 
discolouration; and blood clots or stroke. All risks are material. Sue is advised of 
the risk of infection. Her surgeon does not advise her of any of the other risks. 
Given the perceived benefits of the procedure (in terms of her appearance), Sue is 
comfortable accepting the risk of infection and has the procedure. She develops 
an infection. 
On the authority of Wallace,  although  Sue’s  surgeon  did  not  advise  her  of  all 
material risks, she would not be able to receive compensation for her infection. 
Sue is comfortable with this risk, and because it would be classed as distinct, 
non-disclosure of the other risks would ostensibly not operate to make it a type of 
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physical injury that was unacceptable to her. Yet surely Sue might reasonably 
argue that, while she may have been willing to accept the nature of the risk of 
infection if that had been the only material risk involved, had she known of even 
one other risk (say of numbness), let alone the others, she would not then have 
been willing to chance infection? Therefore, is there not a point at which 
information about other distinct risks will affect individual acceptance of 
another? The High Court may argue that the real issue here is not the acceptance 
of an individual risk of particular physical injury but the combination of all  
the risks such that the procedure (rather than the risk of harm that occurred) 
became unacceptable. P1125F 272 P But given that all material risks are relevant to an 
enquiry concerning factual causation, P1126F273P is   that  not  a  bit   like   trying   to  eat  one’s  
cake whilst keeping it too? In such   a   situation,   even   if   Sue’s   argument   was  
accepted, she would still need to establish that she would not have had the 
procedure ever, or at that time, had all information, including that not disclosed, 
been known. P1127F274P Such factual causation is often hard to establish, P1128F275P and may be 
particularly so where surgery is elective. P1129F276P It is worth remembering in this regard 
that the courts in Wallace did not determine, as a matter of evidence, what the 
patient would have done if he had been advised of both risks, but instead 
assumed this for the purpose of considering the causation issues. P1130F277 
Consequently, Wallace pays insufficient regard to the way in which patients 
may make decisions concerning procedures that carry multiple risks and, in doing 
so, its analysis and treatment of distinct risks arguably erodes the indirect 
protection P1131F278P of   a   patient’s   right   to   informed   decision-making promoted by the 
duty   to  warn.  However,  as  outlined  below,   the  High  Court’s  approach   to   rights  
protection is notably different to the position under English law, which has 
developed in a way that protects individual autonomy more directly. 
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V   CONTRASTING WALLACE WITH THE APPROACH  
UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
Wallace’s   de-emphasised protection of the notion of patient autonomy in 
negligence cases concerning information disclosure can be contrasted with the 
approach adopted by the House of Lords in Chester. P1132F 279 P There are significant 
differences between the Australian and English legal frameworks relevant to a 
medical practitioner’s  obligation   to  disclose   risk, P1133F280P and it is not intended that a 
detailed account of these differences be provided here. Instead, this Part seeks 
merely to demonstrate the greater prioritisation of patient autonomy evident 
under English law. This is significant because, although Wallace’s   formulation   
of scope of liability P1134F281 P is   taken   from   Lord   Steyn’s   judgment   in   Chester, P1135F282 P an 
application of the reasoning adopted by the House of Lords provides an 
illuminating example of how the High Court could have arrived at a very 
different   result  by  giving  greater   force   (or  at   least,  a  wider  scope)   to   the  duty’s  
underlying purpose in terms of its potential to protect patient rights. Thus, this 
comparison raises the question of why, when the factual causation of physical 
harm could potentially be established, the High Court was so reluctant to give 
full  effect  to  the  scope  and  purpose  of  the  practitioner’s  duty  to  warn. 
Chester considered   a   patient’s   ability   to   recover   damages   for   a   surgeon’s  
failure to warn of a one to two per cent risk of cauda equina syndrome, or 
neurological injury, which was material and which did in fact eventuate 
following spinal surgery. P1136F283 P For causation purposes, it was not certain that the 
patient would have completely refused the procedure had she known of the risk 
of developing the syndrome, but it was argued that she would have postponed the 
procedure and sought alternative advice. P1137F284 P The   claimant’s   case   in  Chester was 
therefore based on a similar argument to that pursued by the patient in Chappel v 
Hart.P1138F285 P Akin to Chappel v Hart, because the chance of the risk occurring was 
very  low,  the  ‘but  for’   test  was  regarded  as  satisfied  because,  on  the  balance  of  
probabilities, the risk would not have eventuated if the surgery had been 
performed on another day. P1139F 286 P However, contrary to Chappel v Hart, where a 
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reduction in risk could be shown had the surgery been delayed, in Chester  
the   ‘injury   would   have   been   as   liable to occur whenever the surgery was 
performed   and   whoever   performed   it’. P1140F287 P Consequently, as the negligence had 
neither   increased   the   claimant’s   risk   exposure   nor   exposed   them   to   an  
unacceptable risk, success in Chester v Afshar required a departure from 
purportedly established causation principles. P1141F288 
In a 3:2 majority of the House of Lords, Lords Steyn, Hope and Walker, 
concluded that the claim should succeed. P1142F289 P Lord  Steyn’s   reasoning  was   framed  
as follows: 
Individuals have a right to make important medical decisions affecting their lives 
for themselves: they have the right to make decisions which doctors regard as ill 
advised.   …   [N]ot   all   rights   are   equally   important.   But   a   patient’s   right   to   an  
appropriate warning from a surgeon when faced with surgery ought normatively to 
be regarded as an important right which must be given effective protection 
whenever   possible.   …   [I]n   the   context   of   attributing   legal   responsibility,   it   is  
necessary to identify precisely the protected legal interests at stake. A rule 
requiring a doctor to abstain from performing an operation without the informed 
consent of a patient serves two purposes. It tends to avoid the occurrence of the 
particular physical injury the risk of which a patient is not prepared to accept. It 
also ensures that due respect is given to the autonomy and dignity of each patient. 
…   [I]t   is   a   distinctive   feature   of   the   present   case   that   but   for   the   surgeon’s  
negligent failure to warn the claimant of the small risk of serious injury the actual 
injury would not have occurred when it did and the chance of it occurring on a 
subsequent occasion was very small. It could therefore be said that the breach of 
the surgeon resulted in the very injury about which the claimant was entitled to be 
warned.  … I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  as  a  result  of  the  surgeon’s  failure  
to warn the patient, she cannot be said to have given informed consent to the 
surgery in the full legal sense. Her right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to 
be vindicated … P1143F290 
Lord   Hope   also   observed   that   ‘the   issue   of   causation   cannot   be   properly  
addressed  without  a  clear  understanding  of  the  scope  of  [the]  duty’. P1144F291P Therefore, 
because  ‘the   law  which  imposed  the  duty  to  warn  on  the  doctor  has  at   its  heart  
the right of the patient to make an informed choice as to whether, and if so when 
and  by  whom,  to  be  operated  on’,  to  leave  the  patient  without  a  remedy  ‘would  
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render   the   duty   useless   in   the   cases   where   it   may   be   needed   most’. P1145F 292 P 
Acknowledging  ‘the  importance  of  personal  autonomy’  as  a  ‘basic  human  right’,  
Lord Walker agreed with Lords Steyn and Hope. P1146F293 
Although noting that the purpose of the duty to warn was, in part, to protect 
patients from consenting to procedures containing unacceptable or increased 
risk(s) of particular physical injuries, in Chester,   the   majority’s   approach   to  
causation   was   primarily   focused   upon   protecting   the   patient’s   right   to  
autonomous decision-making.  According  to  Wheat,  ‘[t]he  decision  is  effectively  
acknowledging  …  that  the  failure to respect this right will result in compensation 
being awarded for infringement of that right per se’.P1147F294P Other commentators have 
similarly  observed  that  the  ‘primary  concern  of  the  majority  in  [Chester] was to 
ensure that patient autonomy is respected’.P1148F295 P As such, their Lordships concluded 
that   ‘policy   grounds’   supported   a   causation   finding, P1149F 296 P independently of a 
patient’s   ability   to   show   a   consequent   increase   in   risk,   whenever   there   is   a  
negligent   failure   to   disclose   and   the   harm   that   occurs   is   ‘the   very   risk’   about  
which  the  patient  ‘should  have  been  warned’. P1150F297 
Given that the policy underpinning the finding of causation in Chester was 
based upon a violation of patient autonomy, it might be reasonable to conclude 
that the assertions of Wheat and others are accurate in terms of the position under 
English law. Wallace, on the other hand, confirms that a violation of autonomy or 
self-determination – in the form of failing to disclose material inherent risks of 
treatment – is not the guiding principle for determining whether it is appropriate 
for scope of liability to extend to a medical practitioner under Australian law. P1151F298 P 
Wallace suggests that the question of whether the patient is willing to accept the 
risk that eventuated takes precedence over the notion of their knowledge of that 
risk for the purpose of autonomous decision-making. Thus, the normative 
grounds underpinning the causation findings in the Australian decision of 
Wallace appear distinct to those relevant to English law. 
On the authority of Chester, a case with identical facts to those of Wallace 
may be decided very differently if it were to be considered by an English court. 
We acknowledge that it is unlikely that the House of Lords in Chester was 
contemplating the very different and unique circumstances that arose in Wallace, 
where it was the disclosure of multiple risks that, on  a  ‘but  for’  test  of  causation,  
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would have resulted in the patient avoiding harm. However, Wallace was 
purportedly also a case where it could not be shown that non-disclosure of all 
relevant information exposed the patient to a degree of risk, in relation to the 
particular physical injury suffered, that was unacceptable to them. P1152F299P Requiring a 
normative   determination   about   the   extent,   or   scope,   of   a  medical   practitioner’s  
liability, the views of the majority of the House of Lords in Chester may provide 
a basis to circumvent this issue, were it decided by the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court today, P1153F300P by justifying the imposition of liability on the basis of a wider 
interpretation   of   the   duty   to   warn’s   underlying   purpose   in   protecting   patient  
autonomy. Essentially, the assertion made by Wallace was that had Kam acted  
in accordance with his duty by disclosing all material risks, he would  
have exercised his autonomy in a way that would have declined the procedure 
and avoided exposure to the harm (neurapraxia) in question. P1154F301P The influence of 
Chester’s  type  of  reasoning  is  evident  in  Justice  of  Appeal  Beazley’s  dissenting  
Court of Appeal judgment in Wallace, P1155F302P and it was open to the Australian High 
Court to adopt a similar line of reasoning and thus engage in a broader analysis 
of  the  issues  relevant,  under  scope  of  liability,  to  a  patient’s  decision  to  consent  
to a procedure that carries multiple risks. Clearly the High Court did not wish to 
prioritise the notion of patient autonomy in the same way that the concept was 
directly emphasised by the House of Lords in Chester. Rather, as discussed in 
Part  IV(B),  the  Court  took  a  restrictive  view  of  the  form  of  harm  falling  ‘within  
the  scope  of   the  rule  violated  by   the  defendant’ P1156F303P by adopting only the first, or 
narrower, purpose of the duty to warn advocated by Lord Steyn. P1157F304P Consequently, 
as a matter of policy and by comparison to English law, the High Court has, by 
virtue of its approach to the issue in Wallace, unfortunately adopted a more 
diluted attitude to the protection of patient autonomy in failure to warn cases. 
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VI   CONCLUSION 
In  terms  of  scope  of  liability,  the  courts’  decisions  in  Wallace reflect a policy 
choice that, in failure to warn cases, liability ought only to attach to physical 
injury the risk of which was unacceptable to the patient. It is the product of a 
value judgment or a line drawing exercise as to the extent of a medical 
practitioner’s   liability,   and   by   limiting   negligence   liability   in   this   way   the 
decision is likely to be welcomed by the profession and its insurers. For, as  
stated   by   the   High   Court,   that   choice,   now   made,   will   be   ‘maintained   unless  
confronted   and   overruled’. P1158F305 P Meanwhile, as Chester shows, P1159F306 P a tempering of 
causation principles is possible where justice demands it. A determination of the 
acceptability of a risk and accordingly whether a failure to warn is causative, 
within the framework provided by this article, will depend to a large extent upon 
the nature and categorisation of the risk in question, and this may in the future 
prove contentious and problematic. The High Court did not query the 
classification of the risks in Wallace as being distinct rather than cumulative, 
although the Court of Appeal did confirm that such a classification, for the 
purpose of scope of liability under sections 5D(1)(b) and (4) of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW) (and the equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions), P1160F307P would 
need to occur on the facts of any given case. P1161F308P When this does transpire, it is 
therefore hoped that as wide an interpretation as possible is preferred, as arguably 
such an approach is better aligned with how patients actually make decisions. It 
is additionally more respectful of the autonomy of patients, which the law in this 
area is intended to reinforce. 
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